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1. INTRODUCTION
The First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839-1842 was one of the most disastrous conflicts in
the history of the British Empire. This war caused the death of thousands and the absolute annihilation of the Army of the Indus. This failure, however, occurred after an overwhelmingly successful invasion and the British establishing residence in Kabul. My thesis will analyze the actions of imperial officials leading up to and during the invasion. I will demonstrate that these actions were a deliberate attempt on behalf of imperial officials to securitize British India. Securitization contends that an actor implements a series of practices in an attempt to persuade an audience that a specific referent object faces a critical and existential threat. These processes are
meant to convince the audience that immediate action is necessary, and therefore, empower the
securitizing actor to implement a new policy.1 Further, I contend that the security of British India
was elevated to the status of an authoritative discourse, and therefore, justified the continued territorial expansion and militarization of the East India Company. The value of India and the need
to defend it was clearly articulated in both official and unofficial sources. I will also show that
analyzing history through the lens of securitization offers historians a new and beneficial tool. It
provides critical insight into how imperial policies were produced, enacted, and legitimized. This
acumen can provide new vistas into understanding how governmental policy has been developed
in both the past and present.
1.1 History and Historiography
The First Anglo-Afghan War was one of the most grievous affairs in the annals of British
military history. The Army of the Indus passed through the Bolan Pass in the spring of 1839 in
an attempt to supplant the Afghan sovereign, Dost Mohammad Khan, and install the exiled Shah
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Shuja. Although the initial march on Kabul was an overwhelming success, the war would end in
British humiliation and the death of approximately 16,000 soldiers and camp followers.2 In order to understand the war, and the strategies used to justify it, it is necessary to place the actions
of British officials within the contemporary strategic environment. In order to establish the context, I will provide an overview of the Asian geopolitical climate, the state of Afghan politics, the
East India Company’s territorial expansion in India, and a brief overview of the major events that
shaped the perspective of British imperial officials and their intended audiences.
Empires have been forced to find ways to govern large landmasses which house a multitude of heterogeneous populations. Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
Russians and Chinese under the Qing dynasty significantly increased the size and reach of their
empires. Both of these empires sustained their territorial expansion through the “creative mixes
of ruling practices, their distinctive solutions to the intermediary problem, and their exploitation
of difference to enhance imperial power.”3 Due to the large number of diverse groups in Eurasia,
rulers had to recognize and utilize difference. In addition, these different groups constantly migrated and moved throughout the continent. The movement of large groups meant the borderlands of empire were constantly shifting and were extremely fluid. These migrations and intergroup communication made Asia an extremely dynamic space. This mobility meant that fixing
borders was disadvantageous.4 However, the strategy of amorphous boundaries had to be adapted
once the Russian and the Chinese, and eventually the British, expanded to the point where their
frontiers started to overlap. In order to control the mobile populations in their borderlands, these
empires were forced to delineate clear boundaries. These borders were meant to control the no2
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mads of Asia.5 The Chinese and the Russians, however, were not the only players in Asia at the
time of Europe’s rapid expansion in the continent.
Several great land empires dominated the political situation in Central Asia in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These Islamic empires included the Ottomans, the
Safavids of Iran, and the Mughals of the Indian subcontinent. According to C.A. Bayly, the power of these land empires had begun to wane: “The demise of the Muslim land empires was a critical condition of the rise of European dominance across inland Eurasia and north Africa.”6 The
state of these Islamic empires provided both challenges and possibilities for the British and the
Russians. Various Central Asian communities offered military allies, new trading partners, and
local administrators. Each of these groups shaped the way that Europeans were able to expand
into Asia. However, the fragmentation of these empires also created a serious threat. Without a
strong centre, these different communities possessed relatively limited strength, and therefore,
could potentially be absorbed into a rival power’s sphere of influence. The Central Asian arena
was populated by a multitude of local players who were critical to shaping the political environment.
Afghanistan during the first half of the nineteenth century presented another type of political space. It was fractured and consisted of multiple political centres.7 These polities were governed by different social groupings “as a complex patchwork of cultural groupings and units of
communal identity.”8 These various communities cooperated, competed, and engaged in conflict.
In addition, the fractured nature resulted in continuous intergroup rivalries. These rivalries made

5

Ibid., 216.
C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (London: Longman, 1989), 16.
7
B.D. Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.
8
Ibid., 9.
6

4

internal disorder one of the central themes in Afghan history.9 The collapse of the Durrani Empire in the early nineteenth century created one of the most unstable periods in Afghan history; it
also coincided with the initial encounter between the Afghans and the British.10 This initial interaction, and the different styles of governance, resulted in the British constructing an image of
Afghanistan as a barbaric and anarchic territory.11 This perception would shape British policy
towards Afghanistan into the present. Based upon the emerging fear of internal revolt in India, an
unstable polity on Britain’s frontier was especially threatening.
The East India Company’s expansion into the subcontinent was primarily driven by revenue. India was seen as a tributary province.12 The dividends it produced were dependent upon
land revenue and a local intermediary’s ability to collect funds.13 This ability was directly dependent upon the continued stability of native rulers. Since India’s value depended on land revenue, the East India Company was driven towards territorial expansion. Territorial expansion
was seen as a way to increase profitability and balance the budget.14 According to D.A.
Washbrook “to sustain this continuous process of expansion, the government of India from the
mid-1820s maintained a permanent standing army totaling 235,000 men, which represented the
preponderant military force in all of Asia. Inevitably, its military institutions and purposes came
to shape both state and society.” He refers to the dominance of the military and the territorial expansion it enabled as “military fiscalism.” 15 The expectation to collect revenue from local rul-
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ers, and the willingness to use military force, were central to the governance of British India.
This situation, however, was extremely problematic.
The vulnerabilities, as well as the strengths of the British Empire, shaped the strategies
that were employed in Central Asia, especially during the early stages of expansion. According
to Linda Colley, one of Britain’s greatest limitations was its small population.16 This meant that
Britain was not independently capable of mobilizing an army large enough to control large territories, especially in Asia, and therefore relied heavily on local administrators and soldiers to
maintain the empire. For example, the Indian Army was made up of only 16 European regiments,
compared to 170 sepoy regiments.17 Therefore, while the British sought to employ progressively
more coercive tactics of control, they were also forced to maintain the support and longevity of
local elites and intermediaries.18 The profitability of India, and its value to London, was dependent upon local leaders accepting British rule. The Indian government recognized this situation
and realized that the internal threat posed by local unrest would undermine the value and sustainment of British rule. It was especially afraid that turmoil on the frontier would incite rebellions. A defensive strategy, therefore, was not acceptable. They had to continue to move the
frontiers as far from Company territory, and their internal enemies, as possible.19 In addition to
local threats, the Indian government had to account for the expectations of London.
The imperial government greatly influenced the strategies available to the East India
Company. In the late eighteenth century, the Crown and Parliament became increasingly involved in Indian affairs.20 British engagement in the subcontinent escalated when Napoleon in-
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vaded Egypt, threatening British influence in India and the balance of power in Europe. London’s involvement in Indian affairs placed strict limits on continued expansion beyond the
boundaries established by 1818. According to M.E. Yapp
forward policy was expressly and explicitly forbidden by the East India Company
Directors, by the British Government, and by Act of Parliament. Precautionary measures
of defence would not be tolerated; British India was allowed to go to war only if it were
attacked or in imminent danger of attack. These rigid prohibitions, however, could be
dissolved by the solvent of the external enemy.21
Yapp also argues that the external enemy that became most threatening was Russia.22 The Indian
government had to demonstrate that its actions were in response to an urgent external threat. In
order to justify action, “Britain and British India required a language in which they could discuss
the allocation of resources between them, a language that would mean all things to all men. This
language was supplied by the strategy of defence against the external enemy.”23 The defence of
India, or security, served to justify the actions of British imperial officials. This shared language
allowed the two governments to act in unison and made imperial policy comprehensible to the
metropolitan public.
British imperial officials had to account for two distinct audiences when developing and
implementing plans for the defence of India. The imperial officials had to devise strategies that
were both acceptable throughout the metropole and that would maintain their influence over local intermediaries. Accounting for these distinct audiences made it increasingly difficult to govern India. As Burbank and Cooper argue, “the variety of repertoires of power and the diversity of
interests in distant spaces made it hard for colonial powers to develop a coherent imperial imagi-
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nary.”24 The First Anglo-Afghan War was an attempt to manage both groups with a single political action and the discourse of security.
Let us now turn to the major events that led up to the First Anglo-Afghan War. These
events informed British beliefs and the language used to describe the geopolitical situation. First,
we will examine the various events that took place in Europe and their influence closer to Afghanistan. The first major event was Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798.25 Napoleon’s presence in Egypt caused a great deal of consternation in both London and Calcutta, as both governments recognized the threat posed to British interests in the subcontinent. Shortly after Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, Tsar Alexander took control of Georgia from Persia. The Persian Shah
requested British support to counter the Russian invasion. Wishing to prevent an agreement between Russia and France, the British refused to support the Shah.26 The British and the Ottomans
would eventually defeat the French mission to Egypt in 1802. Although the British were concerned about a Franco-Russian alliance, the opposite ended up happening. Rather than challenging the British in India, Napoleon decided to invade Russia in June 1812. To the surprise of
statesmen throughout Europe, Russia not only brought the French invasion to a halt, but went on
the offensive and eventually entered Paris on March 30, 1814. The Russian victory removed the
Napoleonic threat, and resulted in British newspapers praising the heroism of the Russian Army.27 After Napoleon’s defeat, the great powers of Europe convened the Congress of Vienna to
establish the European balance of power. The Congress curbed Russia’s expansionary desires in
Europe. Asia, however, was left open to conquest.28
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If the Congress stabilized Europe, Russian relations with the Muslim empires on its
southern borders were another matter. Russia penetrated into Persia, resulting in the Treaty of
Gulistan (1813), ceding various Persian domains to Russia. Neither the Persians nor the Russians
were satisfied with the lines drawn by this treaty. Therefore, in December 1825, Shah Abbas
Mirza attacked Russian territory in an attempt to reclaim the land lost in the earlier conflict.
While the Shah was initially successful, Tsar Nicholas eventually drove Persian troops back to
modern day Armenia. As defeat became imminent, the Persian Shah again reached out for British support and again was rebuffed. This resulted in a further loss of British prestige throughout
Central Asia, and Persia becoming a Russian protectorate.29 However, the Russians did not stop
in Persia. In 1829, Russia gained control of Ottoman Erzerum. Shortly after the fall of the fortress city, the Ottomans surrendered on September 14, 1829. Within a relatively short period, the
Russians had defeated the two great southwestern Asian empires, the Ottomans and the Persians.30 This new strategic situation caused great concern in the British and Indian governments.
Shortly after defeating the Ottomans, the Russians came to the aid of the Sultan. In 1831, the revolt of Mohammed Ali in Egypt challenged the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans
requested British support, but the foreign secretary Viscount Palmerston and the British government were indecisive. The Russians quickly seized the opportunity and sent their ships to Constantinople. The Russian presence halted Ali’s march to Anatolia.31 Again, the British looked as
though they were incapable of employing force when necessary, and the Russians therefore appeared to be the rising power in Central Asia. With Persia and the Ottomans under Russian influence, Afghanistan was seen as the last critical buffer between India and Russia.
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Events in Afghanistan also shaped the actions of the Indian governor-general Lord Auckland. The weakening of the great Islamic empires of Asia exacerbated local rivalries. In Afghanistan, Shah Shuja and Dost Mohammad Khan competed for control of Kabul. In 1834, the forces
of Dost Mohammad Khan defeated the army of Shah Shuja outside of Kandahar. In this conflict,
Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, supported Shah Shuja and the result shaped the strategic environment for the next several decades.32 Dost Mohammad Khan and Ranjit Singh remained bitter rivals. Dost Mohammad Khan requested Russian support against Ranjit Singh in
October 1835.33 He also sought British support in 1836. The British, however, had already
signed a defensive treaty with Ranjit Singh in 1809.34 Therefore, Auckland informed Dost Mohammad Khan and the East India Company’s Board of Directors that his policy was to not interfere in Afghan-Sikh affairs.35 Nevertheless, the British still desired commercial and diplomatic
relations with the Afghan court. Sir Alexander Burnes was dispatched to Kabul on September 20,
1837. Captain Ivan Vitkevich, a Russian agent, was sent to the Afghan court on December 24,
1837. Initially, Dost Mohammad Khan seemed to prefer British support, but this changed after
Auckland sent a threatening ultimatum. Still seeking support against Ranjit Singh, and receiving
no support from Britain, Dost Mohammad Khan hosted Vitkevich in the Bala Hisar on April 28,
1838.36 While the drama in Kabul was playing out, the Persian Shah and his Russian advisors
besieged Herat, one of the key cities in the defense of Afghanistan and India. Although the situation in Herat looked dire, the Herati defenses held. While they had failed to act on earlier occasions, the British finally took action. On June 19, 1838, a naval force landed troops at Kharg Is-
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land in the Persian Gulf. This action, and the threat it posed to the Persian heartland, forced the
Shah to retreat.37 Therefore, while the Russians had gained access to the Afghan court in Kabul,
they were denied control of Herat. This chain of events informed the subsequent actions of British imperial officials and the way metropolitan and Indian audiences understood them. Placing
the First Anglo-Afghan War in context is vital to analyzing the processes and outcome of securitization.
My thesis responds and contributes to the larger historiography of the “Great Game.” The
traditional trope of the Great Game revolves around an imperial rivalry between the British and
Russian empires for control of the Eurasian heartland. In the popular works of Shareen Brysac,
Karl Meyer, and Peter Hopkirk, the Great Game is told as an exciting and clandestine adventure
story, which praises the courage and ingenuity of its individual players. The destruction caused
by the imperial rivalry is lost in their prose. Recent authors, like B.D. Hopkins and James Hevia,
have sought to problematize this myth. Hopkins suggests that this narrative misconstrues the
sources available in the imperial archive and that it masks the importance of local circumstances
and actors.38 Hevia argues that the Great Game was not a clandestine affair, but rather a deadly
conflict that resulted in the militarization of the British state in the second half of the nineteenth
century.39 By analyzing the actions and language of imperial officials during the First AngloAfghan War, I will expand on Hevia’s argument. I will demonstrate that the Great Game resulted
in the militarization of the British state before the middle of the nineteenth century. The British
deliberately employed the “arts of governance” to increase their control within the subconti-

37

Ibid., 184.
Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan, 35.
39
James Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire Building in Asia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11.

38

11

nent.40 In addition, my research will show not only that imperial rivalry in Asia resulted in significant suffering, but also that the deliberate actions and decisions of imperial actors produced this
result. It will, I hope, continue to challenge the Great Game trope that has dominated the narrative for decades. Finally, William Dalrymple’s Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan,
1839-1842 was published in 2013. Due to the recent release of this book, it has played a limited
role in the development of my thesis.

1.2 Framework and Methodology
Discourse is central to the construction of reality, and has been vital to the development
of history. I will employ a Foucauldian definition of discourse. The U.S. historian Gail
Bederman explains discourse as a “set of ideas and practices which, taken together, organize
both the way a society defines certain truths about itself and the way it deploys social power.”41
A Foucauldian approach allows an analyst to study rhetoric and policy, and the ways they establish and maintain power relationships. This definition aligns with scholars of securitization, like
Thierry Balzacq, who are greatly influenced by social theory. According to Balzacq, these scholars “talk about securitization primarily in terms of practices, contexts, and power relations that
characterize the construction of threat images.”42 What becomes clear is that discourse is not
simply a set of statements, but incorporates a series of practices that are shaped by context and
that are used in order to manage society. This basic understanding of discourse helps us to define
securitization and its components.
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Securitization Theory was initially articulated in 1997 by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. However, the philosophical approach employed by Buzan was
ill-equipped for empirical studies. In order to remedy this shortcoming, Thierry Balzacq expanded upon Buzan’s methodology. According to Balzacq, securitization is defined
as an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy
tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually
mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent
network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical
vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for
choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented
threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to
block development.43
In this definition, Balzacq makes several points that are critical to understanding the framework.
First, he suggests that an actor can employ a vast array of techniques in order to securitize a referent object. Balzacq contends that an analyst must consider the multiple strategies employed by
policy-makers in order to study the securitizing move. Second, Balzacq makes it clear that context is central to understanding actions. Context informs both the options available to the actor
and the knowledge possessed by the audience. Third, he suggests that the threat must be critical.
The urgency of the threat justifies immediate action to ensure the survival of the referent object.
Finally, the audience is central to his definition. The actions of the securitizing actor are designed
to influence an empowering audience. Successful securitization, therefore, depends upon the target audience accepting the securitizing actor’s argument. In each chapter of my thesis, I will
identify the securitizing actor, target audience, referent object, referent subject, practices utilized,
implications, and the desired policy sought by the securitizing actor. By identifying each of these
parts, I will be able to analyze not only what policies were implemented, but discuss why they
were pursued and what results they produced.
43
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Securitization is codified by three primary assumptions. The assumptions are “1) the centrality of the audience; 2) the co-dependency of agency and context; 3) the structuring forces of
the dispositif, that is a constellation of practices and tools.”44 The securitizing actor focuses its
energies on the “empowering audience.” An “empowering audience is the audience which: a) has
a direct causal connection with the issue; and b) has the ability to enable the securitizing actor to
adopt measures in order to tackle the threat. In sum, securitization is satisfied by the acceptance
of the empowering audience of the securitizing move.”45 The success of a securitizing move is
dependent upon the context that informs it. “Thus, the performative dimension of security rests
between semantic regularity and contextual circumstances.”46 The processes of the securitizing
actor do not take place in a vacuum. Rather, they are informed by external circumstances. These
exogenous forces provide the securitizing actor with both possibilities and limitations, and shape
the way the audience understands these processes. Finally, these different processes are
intersubjective and must be studied together.47 These assumptions require a more holistic analysis of securitization. An analyst must understand the interaction between actor, audience, context,
and processes. Each of these factors shapes the discursive environment and the success of the
securitizing move.
The centrality of the audience, intersubjectivity and co-dependency of agency and context
suggests that the process of securitization is dialogic. These arguments closely mirror Mikhail
Bakhtin’s theories of dialogism, intertexuality, and hetergolossia. Like Balzacq, Bakhtin make it
clear that discourse is a “social phenomenon.”48 In order to advance securitization, I will employ
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one additional aspect of Bakhtin’s theory, the idea of authoritative discourse. He explains that
the
authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it binds us,
quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us internally; we encounter it
with its authority already fused to it. Its authority was already acknowledged in the past.
It is a prior discourse. It is therefore not a question of choosing it from among other possible discourses that are its equal. It is given in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact. Its language is a special (as it were, hieratic) language. It can be profaned. It is akin
to taboo, i.e., a name that must not be taken in vain.49
According to Bakhtin, certain words become elevated and assume unquestionable influence.
Once a word is accepted as authoritative, it shapes all future dialogues. Discussions about this
discourse are no longer about if a subject warrants attention, but how it should be understood. I
contend that successful securitization will result in security becoming an authoritative discourse.
If a referent object is successfully securitized, the debate is no longer about whether the referent
object should be protected, but how. Achieving the status of authoritative discourse infuses a
word and its advocates with newfound power. In order to demonstrate that security had been
elevated to the level of an authoritative discourse, I will expand my study beyond strictly government documents. I will supplement these official sources with discussion in the periodical
press in the months immediately following the invasion. These journalistic sources will show
that the defence of British India had not simply become a priority of government but had also
won the support of the press, which in turn influenced public opinion.
1.3 Terminology
In this thesis, I will utilize various terms that I recognize are potentially problematic, in
part because we have inherited them from the imperial and colonial past. The first term I will be
using is Central Asia. The location of Central Asia, like any geographic region, is fluid and
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changes based upon the geopolitical and strategic situation.50 I will use the term throughout this
thesis because imperial officials and other writers used it. During the early nineteenth century,
Afghanistan was seen as part of Central Asia by actors both in India and Britain. The second and
more problematic term, which will appear at various places throughout this thesis, is tribe. I
will use this term based on its frequency in primary sources and scholarly literature. It was employed in Britain’s first encounter with the various peoples who lived in Afghanistan. According
to Hopkins, the British attempted to compare Afghan society to the Scottish highlands. However,
“more profoundly problematic than the Scottish comparison is the tribal motif employed by
Elphinstone which found favour in the late-Enlightenment intellectual world he inhabited. Rather
than conjuring images of the cruel and racially inferior native that predominated the late nineteenth-century world, tribe continued to resonate with Rousseau’s image of the noble savage.
Free of the late nineteenth-century racialization of tribe, its use here was not an explicitly negative or pejorative labeling.”51 Afghanistan was seen as a politically fractured space. Therefore,
imperial officials sought to capture the division that existed between the different communities
and groups in the territory. In line with past colonial and intellectual experience, the category of
tribe was used to describe the social and political organization of the area. Of course, this term
took on additional meanings in later decades of the age of empire. I use tribe and Central Asia in
my thesis to show how the British imagined and understood the peoples and lands on their
northwest Indian frontier. Historians must apply these terms carefully and readers must keep in
mind the distinct meanings of these terms in the period under study and their changing meaning
over time.
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2. CONJURING THE RUSSIAN MENACE: JUSTIFYING ACTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AUDIENCE
The object was to awaken and direct public attention of this country to the dangerously ambitious projects of Russia, and the alarming position she even then occupied in the East in regards
to the empire of Great Britain in India, and her general interest in Central Asia; and the proof
both of the correctness of its reasoning and the truth of its predictions may be found complete in
the events…to whatever quarter we look, whether in Europe or in Asia, the influence and the
power of Russia is seen upon the increase
John McNeill, 1838
2.1 Introduction
For securitization to take place, the empowering audience must accept the securitizing
move of the securitizing actor.52 Determining the empowering audience, therefore, is vital to
analyzing the actions of securitizing actors. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, London began to exercise increasingly more control over the territorial expansion of the
East India Company.53 According to M.E. Yapp, “the British view of India, as expressed in
Press and Parliament, was an important constraint upon British Indian policy, or at least upon the
ways in which policies could be discussed, arguments about the defence of India had to be
phrased in a manner which would not leave room for critics to declare India to be a burden upon
Britain.”54 Indian officials were unable to act independently of metropolitan approval. In order
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to acquire this approval, the Indian government had to frame their arguments and justify their
actions in a language that would be understood and accepted in London. Yapp goes on to argue
that “Britons in London forbade expansion except under certain conditions. One of these conditions was always a threat from France…after 1815 the French threat dwindled, to be eventually
replaced by that from Russia.”55 A menacing external threat, apparently posed by Russian expansion, served to unify the beliefs and actions of officials in London and Calcutta.56 This chapter will argue that the Indian government (securitizing actor) conjured the spectre of a Russian
threat (referent subject) against British India (referent object) in order to justify the invasion of
Afghanistan (policy) to the Cabinet (empowering audience), the executive committee so to
speak, of the British imperial government.
On May 22, 1838, the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, alerted the Secret
Committee of the East India Company about his intentions towards Afghanistan. In this document, Auckland made several crucial arguments that served to justify the coming invasion. These arguments included the essential characteristics of Asian diplomacy, the fractured nature of
Afghanistan, the critical threat posed by Russian expansion and influence, the peril of internal
turmoil, and the British capability to successfully counter these concerns through direct action.
These arguments were informed and strengthened by prior statements made by functional actors.57 The following sections of this chapter will analyze each of these arguments, and track
their development prior to Auckland’s memorandum. The prior existence of these arguments
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gave the Indian government additional credibility when they were finally used to justify invasion.
The restrictions imposed by technology in the early nineteenth century, made the May 22,
1838 document the main securitizing move. According to Daniel Headrick, “up to the 1830s,
when an Englishman corresponded with someone in India, his letter, carried around Africa on an
East Indiaman, took five to eight months to reach its destination.”58 The glacial pace of communication meant that officials, politicians, and journalists in the metropole debated Indian policies
months after they were initially proposed.

Technological limitation made the May 22, 1838

document extremely influential. It arrived in London early enough to influence debate in the
Cabinet. The information contained in this memorandum ensured that “by the end of August
1838 the broad outline of Auckland’s strategy were known and approved in London. Between
the end of August and the Cabinet meeting on October 6 to 7opinion in London hardened in favour of Auckland’s scheme.”59 Thus the Cabinet had approved the invasion of Afghanistan prior
to Auckland’s “Simla Manifesto” which was delivered on October 1, 1838.

By the time Par-

liament convened in 1839 and began questioning Auckland’s reasoning, the Army of the Indus
had already passed through the Bolan Pass on their way to Kabul. We will now turn our attention to the Auckland’s primary arguments.

2.2 The Nature of Asian Diplomacy
The conventional belief that Asian diplomacy was mired in fraud and duplicity greatly
shaped the expectations and actions of the Indian government. Imperial officials developed and
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maintained a “body of theory and practice” about Asia and Islam.60 These theories suggested
that “Orientals,” including Persians and Afghans, were the supposed opposites of Europeans.61
If diplomacy among Europeans was based upon mutual recognition and shared rules of conduct
and diplomacy between Europeans and Asians lacked these guidelines, then it had to be assumed
that Asians could not be trusted with affairs of state. Indeed Asian rulers and their agents were
thought to employ “corruption, perjury, forgery, to compass their ends.”62 This negative assessment of Asian rulers was a recurrent theme in imperial writing and greatly shaped policy.
The essentially perverse character of Asian diplomacy in British eyes precluded the establishment of a mutual understanding and benefit between the Indian government and Dost Mohammad Khan. Auckland exploited the conventional reputation of Asian leaders in his May 22,
1838 correspondence. He informed the Secret Committee that “Captain Burnes has now been
desired to retire from Cabool as soon as there is reasonable certainty to the faith of the expedition
against Herat, because it is felt that, under the best circumstances, any professions which Dost
Mohammad Khan might make of submission to our wishes would be only hollow and insincere.”63 Auckland made it clear that Dost Mohammad Khan was not to be trusted, and therefore,
action was necessary. Initially, the Indian government had pursued commercial and diplomatic
relations with Kabul. This mission failed, however, when Dost Mohammad Khan continued to
seek British support against Ranjit Singh in Peshawar. The initial dispatch of the mission created
the impression that the Indian government was strictly pursuing trade in Central Asia. However,
Dost Mohammad Khan’s commitment to Afghan priorities caused the British to question wheth-
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er he would adhere to an asymmetric treaty. The Indian government suggested that Dost Mohammad would continue to pursue the control of Peshawar, and that this desire made his commitment suspect. Auckland’s argument that Afghans were treacherous allies was informed by
the writings of previous officials.
The supposed duplicity of Asians was a recurrent theme in official imperial writing. In
1813, John Macdonald Kinneir wrote his foundational text on Central Asia, A Geographical
Memoir of the Persian Empire. This work heavily influenced the beliefs and actions of future
imperial officials by explaining the current situation in Central Asia and suggesting the essential
characteristics of Asians. Kinneir claimed the right to speak with authority based upon his vast
experience and wide travels in Asia. He had served in the Madras native infantry and “was attached to Sir John Malcolm’s mission in Persia in 1808-9, during part of which time he was supernumerary agent at Bushehr, and made numerous journeys in Persia.”64 His service in India
and Central Asia provided him with firsthand knowledge of his subject. This expertise gave him
the authority to address a metropolitan audience about Asia. A Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire provided readers with what was believed to be the objective reality of Central Asia.
The Asian character was a primary topic in Kinneir’s work. For example, “the Persians
are totally devoid of many estimable qualities, and profoundly versed in all the arts of deceit and
hypocrisy. They are haughty to their inferiors, obsequious to their superiors, cruel, vindictive,
treacherous and avaricious, without faith, friendship, gratitude, or honour.”65 He goes on to
write that “avarice is the leading feature in the Persian character, and at the shrine of this detesta-
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ble vice, every feeling of friendship and honour is sacrificed without a blush.”66 Together, these
statements paint a damning image of the Persian character. He contends that Persians, and Afghans, are inherently perfidious. Unlike Europeans, they will readily break an alliance or sabotage a friendship in order to pursue their own personal ambitions. However, Kinneir does not
suggest that these traits are limited to a specific individual or leader. Rather, he suggests that
they apply to every Persian. This essential truth implies that the Afghan leaders encountered by
Auckland were the same as the Persians experienced by Kinneir. According to both of these officials, Asian leaders were not to be trusted.67 The belief that Asians were essentially duplicitous
provided legitimacy to Auckland’s argument.

2.3 The Anarchic Neighbor
The perceived state of anarchy in Afghanistan produced anxiety in the minds of imperial
officials. According to B.D. Hopkins, by 1818 “the often-violent competition for the Afghan
throne turned into a civil war between competing Durrani tribes. Although the civil war effectively reached a stalemate by 1823, the British continued to view the complicated in-fighting of
Afghan sardãrs as little more than anarchy.”68 Due to the political turmoil in Afghanistan, the
British believed the territory to be extremely volatile and threatening. This initial representation
of Afghanistan as anarchic played an integral role in shaping British policy. The understanding
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of the Afghan political environment held by imperial officials categorically shaped their policies.69 These initial assumptions were apparent in Auckland’s justification.
Afghanistan’s fractured political environment was construed as a direct threat to British
India. The most concerning aspect of this disunity was its potential to create a power vacuum in
Central Asia. It was feared that this void might be immediately filled by Russian influence.
Auckland expresses these concerns in his memorandum. He reports that “the distracted condition of Affghanistan, from the open and acrimonious contests between the Sikhs and the Chief of
Cabool on the one side, and between the Rulers of Candahar and Herat on the other, and from the
total absence of any feeling of harmony and mutual confidence among different branches of the
Barukzye family, had been the immediate cause of proffers of submission to Tehran, and to the
invitation of Persian and Russian influence in the country.”70 Afghanistan was consumed by a
multitude of intergroup competitions. It was argued that Dost Mohammad Khan did not possess
the authority to control even his family, let alone the entirety of Afghanistan. He was constantly
engaged in conflicts with his brothers in Kandahar and Ranjit Singh in Peshawar. It was believed that these rivalries would compel individual actors to pursue support from foreign powers.
It was feared that these rulers would court Russia as a way to achieve their personal aspirations,
and that Russia would exploit this disunion to advance their march on British India. Auckland
was not the first official to worry over the possible regional consequences of local struggles in
Afghanistan.
Central Asia and Afghanistan were consistently presented as being engulfed by a state of
chaos and disunity. One of the first authors to express this turmoil was Jon Macdonald Kinneir.
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In his commentary on Persia, he stated that “these boundaries comprehend many great provinces
and several kingdoms, which I shall hereafter endeavor to describe, although the dominion of the
present King does not extend over many of these countries.”71 In the first page of Kinneir’s
work, he exposes metropolitan audiences to the political disorder of Central Asia. This argument
colored both his work and subsequent authors’ works. Britons were presented with a space that
was not under the control of an individual sovereign. Without a central power, this space was
open to a horde of actors who would pursue their own conflicting political interests. Auckland
clearly subscribed to this sense of a volatile geopolitical environment. He suggests that many
Asian rulers were vying for supremacy in Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is feared that Russia
will exploit these competitions for its own gain. The turmoil of Central Asia as a region was especially prevalent in Afghanistan.
While Kinneir presented Central Asia as a chaotic region, subsequent writers focused
their readers’ attention on Afghanistan. Sixteen years after Kinneir published his work, Lieutenant Colonel George de Lacy Evans wrote On the Practicality of an Invasion of British India: And
the Commercial and Financial Prospects and Resources of the Empire. Evans argued that Russian expansion posed an imminent threat to British India. Evans constantly quoted “often highly
selectively, the evidence and opinions of both British and Russian travelers to prove the feasibility of a Russian thrust against India.”72 Central to Evans’s argument was the instability and fragility of Central Asian polities. These areas would pose little or no challenge for an advancing
Russian force. He also argued that “Caubul has been invariably regarded as the key of India.”73
Therefore, whichever power controlled Kabul would control India. A strong Kabul was critical
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for the security of British India. Evans went on to explain that the present state of Kabul has
been extremely tumultuous. He explains that “in a political sense, the kingdom of Caubul, as it
is called, is in a state of decomposition…for nearly thirty years a species of anarchy has
reigned.”74 The state of Afghanistan is central to Evans’s argument. He is committed to demonstrating the existential threat posed by Russia to India, and he directly connects the anarchic state
of Afghanistan to his fears about Russia. A weak and disorganized Afghanistan will serve as a
stepping stone for the Russian advance into India. Auckland used this argument again a decade
later in his May 22, 1838 memorandum. A fractured Afghanistan served as “an invitation” for
Russian expansion.

2.4 The Advancing Russian Menace
The Russian menace was easily understood by a metropolitan audience, which lubricated
the Indian government’s securitizing move. Russia could be forcefully presented as the referent
subject due to the various events and utterances that had predated Auckland’s memorandum.
According to Balzacq, “the success of securitization is contingent upon a perceptive environment. Therefore, the positive outcome of securitization, whether it is strong or weak, lies with
the securitizing actor’s choice of determining the appropriate times within which the recognition,
including the integration of the ‘imprinting’ object – a threat – by the masses is facilitated.”75
The success of Auckland’s securitizing move was dependent on the context that informed it. For
the securitizing move to be successful, and garner the desired response from the empowering audience, it had to exploit heuristic artefacts that were already familiar in the metropole. After
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1815, Russia represented the most ominous threat in London.76 This sense of peril was critical in
Auckland’s attempt to justify the use of military force.
The need to counter Russian influence in Central Asia served as Auckland’s primary rationale for military actions. He both begins and concludes his May 22, 1838 memorandum with
words about this looming threat. The opening of his memorandum draws the audience’s attention to the current situation in Afghanistan. He states that he has “the honour to submit herewith
copies of despatches from Captain Burnes on political Employ in Cabool, from which your
Honourable Committee will perceive that the Increase of Russian and Persian Influence in
Affghanistan, and the Impression of the certain Fall of Herat to the Persian Army, have induced
Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan to avow and to insist upon Pretensions for the Cession to him, by
Maharajah Runjeet Sing, of the Peshawur territory, and to take other Steps which are tantamount
to the Rejection of the Friendship and good Offices of the British Government; and have in consequence led to the Retirement of Captain Burnes from the Territories of Cabool.”77 While the
Persian Army is carrying out the siege of Herat, Auckland makes it clear that Russian influence
is the primary concern. The primary threat posed by the fall of Herat is the expansion of Russian
influence into the western part of Afghanistan. Auckland also redirects the Committee’s attention from the fortress of Herat to Dost Mohammad Khan’s court in Kabul. Russian influence has
empowered the Amir to make insupportable demands on the British and has destroyed any possibility of a successful outcome to negotiations with him. Auckland concludes this memorandum
by begging “leave to draw the attention of your Committee to the unequivocal demonstrations
therein noted, of the extent to which Russia is carrying her system of interference on the very
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threshold of the British Indian possessions.”78 Although Auckland spends a portion of this
memorandum addressing the status of various rulers and polities of Central Asia, he is mainly
concerned with Russia. By naming Russia as the primary adversary in the region and aiming his
challenge at Russian power, Auckland is linking his appreciation of the situation and his proposed operations to the wider concerns of British strategy and foreign policy.
The anxiety felt in London about Russia was due to the strategic environment in Europe,
compounded by Russophobic propaganda. Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815 altered the
balance of power in Europe. Propagandists in London began arguing that Russia was destined to
replace France as the dominant force in Europe and Asia. One of the first authors to construct
this threat was General Robert Wilson. In A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia: In the Year 1817, Wilson exposes his reader to what he envisions as Russia’s future hegemony. He asserts that when
Alexander came to the throne thirty-six millions of people acknowledged his authority;
but at this day, by increase and acquisition, there cannot be less than forty-two millions at
the LOWEST calculation; and not of Asiatic houseless hordes, wandering in deserts, but
chiefly of Europeans situated in territories, whose military and political value to Russia
does not merely consist in an augmentation of her revenue and her number of souls, but
as will be shown hereafter, in CONTRACTING her line of defence, and at the same time
affording her powers to advance to positions, that must, if properly occupied, secure the
command of Europe and of Asia!79
Three aspects of Wilson’s argument are especially illuminating. First, he demonstrates that Russia’s current pursuit of power is not an isolated event, but rather, a historic theme. This theme is
evident by Alexander’s appearance. Russia has been figuratively, and literally, marching towards universal hegemony. Second, Wilson draws upon the demographic power of Russia. One
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of Britain’s perceived limitations in these years was its relatively small population.80 By possessing a population of at least “forty-two million peoples,” Russia presented an especially
threatening force. Russia’s strength appeared to match Britain’s weakness. Finally, Wilson connects the situation in Europe and Asia. Russian expansion in one continent would directly increase their power and capabilities in the other. If this was indeed the case, Russian influence in
Afghanistan would advance Russian power in Europe.
In 1838, the year of Auckland’s memorandum, the Russian spectre seemed especially sinister. Sir John McNeill, a British political envoy to Persia, focused his readers’ attention not
simply on Russia’s predisposition towards expansion, but precisely on its imminent threat to the
borderlands of Britain’s Indian possessions. He proclaimed that
in short, we see Russian influence, instead of being limited to the line of the Arras, prevailing now, not at Herat alone, but at Caubul – nay, even to the banks of the Indus. Nor
is the rapidity of this progress less alarming and astounding than its unerring certainty.
Sixty-four years, that is, from 1772 till 1835-6, were required to advance the southern
frontier of the Czars a distance of 700 miles. Within these last two years the Emperor
Nicholas has advanced his influence, if not his troops, from the Arras to Caubul, a stride
of more than 2000 miles. It signifies little to object that the Russian troops are not yet
even at Herat: the time may not be ripe for the last decided step of military occupation;
but it is fast approaching and if England remains as indifferent to the present and the future as she has been to the past, the consummation will speedily be witnessed.81
Several aspects of this comment seem to have shaped Auckland’s actions. First, both Auckland
and McNeill emphasize that Russian influence is being felt in both Herat and Kabul. It is feared,
therefore, that Russia now controls the two main invasion routes into India. The control of both
routes presents British strategists with significant challenge. Russia possesses the freedom to
invade through whichever route is the weakest in terms of British defences. Next, the monstrous
scope of Russian expansion is presented, especially within the last two years. Russia’s southern
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frontier is creeping daily towards India. He argues that Russia’s true objectives are “found complete in the events.”82 As long as the British do nothing, the Russians will continue to close on
their frontier. This leads into McNeill’s final argument. Here, he does not strictly report the
“facts” of the situation, but rather, makes a call to arms. British complacency is presented as the
main cause of Russia’s rapid advance. It is suggested, however, that if the British act decisively,
they may yet be able to curb the spread of Russian influence in Central Asia. McNeill’s argument was presented just before Auckland’s decision. Metropolitan audiences read about the dire
situation and the need for action, just as it was being contemplated.

2.5 The Russian Presence on the Indian Frontier
The defence of British India was not independent of European and global rivalries. India’s role in the accrual of British power turned it into a potential battlefield, where European
rivals could contest British power. Edward Ingram explains that “as soon as Great Britain as
great power was transformed by the conquest of India into a duel monarchy, her European enemies could give up the difficult task of invading the British Isles for the simpler task of creating a
sphere of influence in the Middle East. The danger feared by the British was not invasion but
rebellion and bankruptcy”83 The defence of India and the balance of power in Europe were intimately connected. In order for Britain to maintain its prestige in Europe, it had to maintain its
control of India and the revenue it produced. European rivals could decrease British revenue by
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inciting local revolts and rebellions.84 The arrival of a Russian force on the frontier of India
might cause these revolts and thereby undermine British rule.
Auckland reported his concern about the potential for local resistance if Russia reached
the Indian frontier. Moreover, he worries that the Persian siege of Herat will turn this nightmare
into a reality. He states that “the extraordinary excitement which has been produced in the public mind, as well in the Punjaub and Affghanistan, in consequence of the approach of the Persian
power, is also a signal to us of the mischief which might arise, were the power to acquire a settled authority or influence over all the Affghan countries.”85 The Indian response to the Persian
siege of Herat serves as a harbinger of the unrest that will result from foreign intrigue in Afghanistan. Auckland suggests that the Persian siege, reinforced by Russian influence, were responsible for Dost Mohammad Khan’s rejection of British offers of friendship and commerce. The
strife caused by foreign influence is no longer limited to the speculations of functional actors. It
is now observable throughout Afghanistan. Foreign intrigue had already caused significant turmoil, even before the Russian and Persian forces had successfully subdued Herat or gained control of Afghan territory. If these powers could establish control in Afghanistan, they would be
able to spawn discontent across the Indus. Indian officials were continually concerned about an
external actor inciting or inspiring native rebellion.
Internal turmoil was a primary concern throughout the British experience in India. It was
emphatically expressed by the “Savior of Empire,” Warren Hastings. He explained that “the
country contains at least six millions of inhabitants, every adult male of whom is provided with
arms, and habituated to the use of them, THE FORCE, HOWEVER, IRREGULAR, CAPABLE
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TO BE THENCE COLLECTED IN THE REAR OF THE ARMY WITH WHICH WE WERE
MEETING THE INVADER ON THE FRONTIER, WAS A SUBJECT NOT TO BE REVOLTED WITHOUT ANXIETY.”86 Hastings suggests that internal turmoil is especially threatening
when the British are already engaged in a conflict with an external enemy. He presents local resistance as an irregular rabble. This rabble would be easily defeated if the British were able to
concentrate their forces against the revolt. If the British were engaged in a conflict with a European enemy, however, this irregular force would be capable of attacking the British rear, and
making it exceedingly difficult to defeat the European rival or the native revolt. Internal revolt
and external conflict are additive. If they erupt together, the British will face a horror that might
undermine the value of Britain in India.
Evans expanded upon Hastings argument and presented Russia as the primary external
force that might produce internal turmoil. Evans argues that “Russia may not shortly acquire a
degree of intercourse with India that will enable her – first, to disturb and disaffect the public
mind of that country towards us whereby India must soon become either untenable to us, or,
from the excess of expenditure over receipts, resulting from this state of things, unworthy of further retention.”87 He makes several arguments that are especially important to Auckland’s later
securitizing move. First, he draws his readers’ attention to the Russian threat. Unlike Hastings,
the external threat is no longer a faceless entity, but rather, the Russian Cossack. The siege of
Herat and Vitkevich’s presence in Kabul might open the aforementioned intercourse between
Russia and India. Next, Evans suggests that a Russian force crossing the Indus is not the primary
concern. Rather, it is Russia’s presence on the frontier that will have crippling effects on Britain’s ability to control the subcontinent cheaply. The external threat will cause turmoil, which
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will be exceedingly costly to subdue. This expense will make the continued control of India unjustifiable and will end the British presence in India. In order to maintain control, the Indian
government must ensure that the Indians do not perceive Russia as a potential ally or Britain as a
weak power.
British actors on the frontier and local informants corroborated this concern. One of the
most important voices shaping the attitudes of Auckland was Mohan Lal Kashmiri. Lal was a
“great traveler, brilliant diplomat, reputed author, the first Kashmiri to learn English and probably the first Indian to educate his daughter in England.”88 He also served as Alexander Burnes’s
linguist during his initial excursion through Central Asia and later in the First Anglo-Afghan
War. Due to his position and talents, Lal had the ear of important British actors in India, including Auckland. As a native informant, he confirmed the British fear of Indian discontent. He explained that
the necessity so apparent for taking immediate steps to counteract the openly united intrigues and encroachments of the Russian ambassador and the Shah of Persia, which had
most effectually made their way into Sindh and the interior of India. It is unnecessary for
me to beg the readers to trace their way back in the histories of former times, and in the
records and publications which are so numerous, and which will all bear a prompt witness that whenever any rumours of invasion from the west of the Indus have been afloat
they have always excited very much the people of India.89
The dangerous state of affairs in Afghanistan was now known to Indians. In order to maintain
control, the British had to act immediately. Lal also contends that Indians had a historical
memory of invasions and the reverberations of even fears or hopes of invasion on the stability of
the country. Turmoil in India had always been tied to events across the Indus. Action had to be
taken to suppress rumors in the bazaar and discourage any thought of revolt.
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Russian influence and the urgency of measures to counteract were articulated to the metropolitan audience. McNeill asserts that the siege of Herat has pushed the Indian government to
a point of no return. He also makes it clear that the metropole must accept the beliefs and actions
of the man on the spot. He contends that
were she [Russia] established at Herat, the influence she would exert in India, even in
times of peace, would be such as to render the government of that country much more
delicate and difficult than it now is. Those who best know India, not merely the presidencies but the provinces, will comprehend the charge that would be effected in our position there, by the presence, within such a distance as to make a collision probably, of any
power equal to our own. Rebellions would become more frequent and formidable. The
revue would in many places be collected with difficulty, and in some the full amount
would not be paid.90
The Russian presence in Afghanistan would produce constant restlessness in India. Even if their
forces did not press the offensive, their mere presence would have devastating results. It would
increase the number of rebellions in the country and decrease the revenue being collected in the
country. These concerns were being reported by British experts on India. According to Balzacq,
“the expression of the power of words, in the sense relevant here, depends on the context and the
power position of the agent that utters them.”91 The speaker and the specific strategic environment matter to the credibility of the securitizing move. The siege of Herat and the Russian mission to Kabul presented a strikingly threatening situation. In addition, as both McNeill and
Balzacq make clear, the man on the spot is the primary actor capable of recognizing and describing the threat. Their supposed expertise makes their arguments seem credible and objective. In
order to convince the Cabinet, Auckland utilizes the arguments of his men on the spot to legitimize his decision.
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2.6 The British Capability to Respond
While Russia may indeed have posed an existential threat to British India, more than just
a threat was necessary for the success of the securitizing move. The British had to see themselves as capable of countering the Russian advance. In Auckland’s correspondence to the Secret Committee, he included two additional documents. The second document provided was a
letter between Deputy Secretary Henry Torrens and William Macnaghten, the Secretary to the
Government of India from May 15, 1838. In this document, Torrens lays out the Indian government’s position for negotiations with the Maharajah Ranjit Singh. He explains that the Governor-General “feels strong in Military Means, and that with an Army of 100,000 Men under European Officers in Bengal, and with 100,000 more whom he might call to his Aid from Madras
and Bombay, he can with Ease repel every Aggression, and punish every Enemy.”92 The Indian
government suggests that its military forces are capable of countering any rival in the East, including Russia. While the Indian Army would eventually be victorious, the expenditure necessary to win the war would impede or even defeat the purpose of British dominance in India, the
collection of tribute.93 The Indian government’s statement makes it clear that the armed forces
have the ability to halt Russian expansion, but that immediate action is necessary to ensure the
costs would not be crippling.
Immediately before the First Anglo-Afghan War, Russophobes argued that Britain possessed the capability to oppose Russian ascendancy. It was suggested, however, that if Russian
thrusts were to be curbed, immediate and decisive action was imperative. McNeill directly engaged this subject in Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East. McNeill presented
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Russia as an emerging Eurasian power. While it represented a significant threat to British hegemony, McNeill suggested to his readers that it was not too late to arrest Russian expansion.
He believed that “England may be assured that Russia dreads her. She does and will continue to
advance, step by step, until patience is worn out, and indignation is roused. Then, and not till
then, will Russia recede.” 94 While the Russians were accumulating the military power and reach
to counter the British in Europe and Asia, they had not yet reached parity. Russia was still afraid
of British arms and therefore would retreat if the British pursued a resolute course of action. If
action was not taken, however, Britain and Russia would shortly possess comparable strength, or
worse, Russia would surpass Britain. Decisive action had to be taken prior to the achievement
by Russia of symmetrical power with Britain.
Successful securitization must convince the audience that immediate action is necessary
to counter an existential threat.95 McNeill suggests that unless immediate action was taken, Britain would lose the opportunity to react. He suggests that Russia is on the brink of surpassing
Britain as the predominant power in Asia in 1838, and thus represents an existential threat to
British India. With the siege of Herat and Vitkevich’s mission in Kabul, the
point in the progress of Russia, when resistance to her dangerous ambition becomes imperative, has surely been reached. The moment for firmness is language and decision in
act has arrived; and let it not be forgotten that a neglect of such junctures – a constant
sacrifice of opportunities in dealing with a powerful and encroaching adversary – must at
length place us in a position where to struggle may be in vain, and we may awake from
our lethargy too late for safety.96
McNeill staunchly contends that immediate action must be taken. British India had come to a
crossroads. If the British act, they can stop Russian enlargement. If they remain indecisive and
passive, they will lose the opportunity to respond. With this inescapable choice in mind, Auck94
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land alerts the Secret Committee that “the rapid March of Events may oblige me to act.”97 The
Indian government makes it clear that Russia now represents an immediate existential threat.
Together, Auckland and McNeill make it clear that Britain can still curb Russian influence and
entrench British power in India for the foreseeable future. In order to do this, however, action
must be taken immediately before the opportunity is lost forever.

2.7 Conclusion: Silencing the Opposition
Auckland’s securitizing move was meant to convince the Cabinet that military action in
Afghanistan was critical to preserving the security (and profitability) of British India. In the May
22, 1838 memorandum, Auckland informed the Cabinet that events in Afghanistan may force
him to act prior to their approval. Auckland made the decision to invade Afghanistan prior to receiving the Cabinet’s blessing. However, he realized that London’s support was vital to legitimate the conflict and authorization for a permanent residence in Kabul. The Cabinet would unanimously approve Auckland’s strategy in October 1838.98 Although the invasion of Afghanistan
came before Parliament in February 1839, the British government’s tactics had stolen a march,
literally and figuratively, on the opposition and little criticism was voiced initially in Parliament
about this distant expedition into the interior of Central Asia.
The initial presentation of the invasion occurred in Parliament on February 5, 1839.
Queen Victoria made a brief reference to the actions of the Indian government in her speech at
the opening of the new session. Shortly after the introduction of these events, the Duke of Wellington rose and told the Lords that “it is impossible for me, or for any person ever so little ac-
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quainted as many of your Lordships must be with this subject, to pretend to give any opinions
upon the point; but as it is alluded to in the Speech from the Throne, and in the Address moved
by the noble Earl, I conclude that her Majesty’s Government will consider it their duty to give
this House, and the other House of Parliament all the information in their power, in order to enable the public to form a judgment on these important transactions.”99 The Duke of Wellington, a
member of the Conservative opposition,100 decided to suspend his judgment until further information was received. Viscount Melbourne, the Whig Prime Minister, was agreeable to Wellington’s call for information before any decisions were made. He stated that “with reference to the
great affairs of the Oriental empire, to all the important measures which are being taken in the
East, I trust the House will adopt the expectation of the noble Duke, and suspend judgment on
these matters till we have full information and knowledge of all the various circumstances, and
of the principles on which the operations have been conducted. Everybody knows the magnitude
of the question, the danger, the difficulty, and delicacy of its position, and I do hope, with the
noble Duke, that the House will not proceed to consider the question till it is in possession of full
information on the subject, and that then it will be debated with the utmost calmness and impartiality.”101 Melbourne implored Parliament to postpone making a decision on the invasion of
Afghanistan until they were fully informed on the events that brought about the military movement. The debate ultimately ended with Parliament requesting papers prior to making a decision.
The initial debate on the invasion of Afghanistan took place at the beginning of February
1839, but Parliament had only received Auckland’s “Simla Manifesto” and several Asian treaties
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by the middle of March. This caused the Earl of Aberdeen to move for the presentation of papers on Afghanistan. He engaged Melbourne, informing him that Parliament
could only look to the manifest of the Governor-general, which he had sent forth to the
world, and which had been communicated to that House; and what led him to make any
observation upon it was, that he wished the noble Viscount to understand that much explanation would be required before he could accept that declaration, which was, of
course, partial, as a justification of the policy which had been adopted; and he must say,
that judging by that exposition alone, he had never seen a document which require more
explanation, or which appeared so much to justify the worst imputations that had ever
been cast on our Eastern policy. It was to be considered as a favourable statement, issued
by the Governor-general to justify his future course; and no man could say, unless it were
subsequently explained, this course was not as rash and impolitic, as it was ill-considered,
oppressive, and unjust. It was possible, however, that his opinion might be modified by
what might be produced hereafter. He would move, in the first instance, for copies of
any correspondence which had passed with the court of Caubul and the rulers of
Affghanistan.102
Aberdeen makes several important points. First, he makes it clear that Parliament had received
limited information in regards to British relations with Afghanistan prior to the invasion. Although a month and a half had passed since the initial notification, Parliament still did not possess
sufficient information to pass judgment on the event. Second, he argues that the war appeared to
be unjust and impolitic in light of the little information contained in the “Simla Manifesto”. The
manifesto did not include a full justification of the war. Parliament could not determine whether
the Indian government’s actions were acceptable. Third, he suggests that his opinion might be
changed if the Government provided additional information. In reply, Melbourne requested several additional days to compile the requested information. The papers were finally ordered on
March 27, 1839.
The delay in providing information meant that parliamentary critics of the government
did not challenge the war. By the time the papers were finally ordered, the Army of the Indus
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had already reached Quetta and was less than a month away from securing Kandahar. This obstruction meant that by the time Parliament had the necessary information to debate the invasion,
it was far too late to halt the operations of the Indian Army. Even if Parliament had acted immediately upon receipt of these papers, it would have been months before any countermanding order could have reached India. In fact, Shah Shuja entered Kabul and reclaimed his throne on August 7, 1839. Parliament’s “stop order” would have reached India, at the earliest, a month too
late.
Apart from the delay, the documents presented to Parliament only reinforced the Government case. According to Yapp, “the papers were cleverly chosen so as to demonstrate the nature of the activities of Russian agents. They were also edited with a view to strengthening the
case against Dost Mohammad by making him seem more obdurate than was the case.”103 The
Government selected and edited documents very deliberately to construct a specific argument.
In the papers provided to Parliament, Russia was presented as an existential threat, and Dost
Mohammad Khan was portrayed as an irrational religious fanatic bent on his own aspirations.
Even if papers had been supplied to Parliament in a timely fashion, the information contained in
the papers was, to say the least, favorable to the government. The intelligence in the papers
pointed in only one direction, the need to counter a Russian threat in Afghanistan.
Ultimately the Opposition did not challenge the Government on Afghanistan. Yapp suggests that this decision was because “the Central Asian question was poor tactical territory for an
attack on the Government. Probably the Tories were wise to avoid a debate on Central Asia; the
later military successes in Afghanistan, although greeted by Melbourne with contemptuous derision, were treated as triumphs. The question was not raised in Parliament again until after the
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disasters in 1842.”104 By exploiting the delays inherent in parliamentary procedure, the technological limitations of worldwide communication in the 1830s, and the short-term military successes of the Army of the Indus, the Government was able to outmaneuver the Opposition. By
gaining the support of the British imperial government in London, Auckland acquired the ability
to act expeditiously in Afghanistan. The metropolitan audience was convinced that the Army of
the Indus had been deployed to counter an imminent Russian threat. Yet the Indian government’s
real concern was internal unrest and revolt predicated on mere rumor of a Russian advance. The
utilization of military force in Afghanistan was meant to demonstrate British power and prestige
to an Indian audience and put down any danger of Indian trouble rather than quiet Afghan turbulence or oppose any chance of Russian invasion.
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3. COUNTERING THE INTERNAL THREAT: THE TACTICAL PEDAGOGY OF THE
AFGHAN INVASION
The Governor General is proud to express the acknowledgements of the Government to the Army of the Indus, which alike by its valor, its discipline, and cheerfulness under hardships and
privations, and its conciliatory conduct to the inhabitants of the countries through which it
passed, has earned respect for the British name, and has confirmed in central Asia a just impression of British energy and resources. A march of extraordinary length, through difficult and untried countries, has been within a few months successfully accomplished; and in the capture of
the one stronghold where resistance was attempted, a trophy of victory has been won, which will
add a fresh lustre to the reputation of the armies of India.
General Orders, Commander of the Forces, 1839
3.1 Introduction
Securitization is a social process, and therefore it, is structured by the power relationship
between securitizing actors and empowering audiences. According to Thierry Balzacq, “the key
argument is that both successful and failed securitizations, are best captured by disaggregating
the audience, as different audiences are receptive to different kinds of arguments, and have distinct types of power.”105 For securitizing actors to successfully persuade the empowering audience, they must speak through an easily accessible language. Due to the perceived differences
between cultures and audiences, securitizing actors must employ different means of persuasion
for different groups. These differences are especially apparent when analyzing the practices and
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policies of empires. According to Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, “the concept of empire
presumes that different people within the polity will be governed differently.”106 In order to
manage vast territories and a variety of peoples, empires pursued specific policies, or repertoires
of power, that they believed would best adhere to the specific political and cultural context of
each locale.107 After the American Revolution, “to many in England, it appeared as if holding
the remaining empire together would depend less on appeal to a common ‘Britishness’ and more
on the direct exercise of power over people regarded as backwards or elites seen as tyrannical.
But British ability to carry off their harsher control was still constrained by the need to give local
elites a stake in the imperial enterprise.”108 For the British to manage their imperial possessions
in Asia, they had to develop and implement policies that forced submission, and yet, retained the
support of local rulers.109 Imperial officials utilized a multitude of practices to sustain their control in India.
By invading Sindh and Afghanistan, the Indian government was able to exhibit their military prowess; while concurrently maintaining their relationships with local intermediaries. In
this chapter, I argue that the military tactics (securitizing move) employed by the Indian government and Army of the Indus (securitizing actor) served as a set of intersubjective practices,
which were meant to showcase British power and validate British prestige in the region. These
practices were meant to force local rulers (empowering audience) to accept their subjugation and
deliver their collaboration (policy). Through this show of force, the Indian government (referent
subject) cast themselves as an existential threat to local rulers and their ability to maintain their
rule (referent object) if they failed to recognize British dominance. Specifically, I will analyze
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the submission of Sindh, the capture of the fortress at Ghazni, the symbolic defeat of Islam, and
the practical and discursive role of military parades and gun salutes. The dispositif110 of these
military practices served to present a clear and explicit message to local rulers.

3.2 How to Govern Asia
British power in India was dependent upon the application of coercive techniques. In order to clearly communicate a lesson, imperial officials had to speak in a language that was easily
understood by a native audience. According to Balzacq, “effective persuasion requires that a
speaker’s argument employs terms that resonate with the hearer’s language.”111 If a speaker
does not employ a language known to the hearer, miscommunication and misunderstanding is
bound to take place. A speaker must, therefore, determine which language and arguments will
be most accessible by their audience. The Indian government believed that the language of military might and coercive force was the most applicable language when communicating with native rulers and peoples.
The use of force to communicate a message was seen as fundamental to control in Asia.
Imperial officials believed that Asian peoples had always been ruled and taught through fear, and
that it was the only successful means of communication. This understanding was expressed in
the writing of several key functional actors. According to George de Lacy Evans, “Asiatics
have, in all ages, been familiar with conquest, and with the undistinguished display of overt authority, wherever power exists; and the abstinence from it, or what has been termed the ‘non-
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interference plan,’ they have constantly proven incapable of appreciating.”112 Evans is making
several important arguments that shaped future imperial tactics. First, he argues that the use of
force has been the primary tool of maintaining control throughout Asian history. Due to the supposed nature of Asians, they can and must be governed through the use of overt power. Second,
he argues that any other technique of governance would be misunderstood. Since force has constantly been used, less oppressive techniques would be unrecognizable to an Asian audience. In
order to communicate unambiguously with Asian subjects and successfully govern Asian polities, it was vital to use the established repertoires of power.
The importance and appropriateness of force was a recurring argument made by individuals who directly shaped the positions and policies of the East India Company. Due to his travels and immense experience, Alexander Burnes was seen as an expert on Central Asia and its
peoples. During his initial trek to Kabul and Bukhara, Burnes expressed his beliefs about proper
governance in these territories. While traveling through Sindh, Burnes reported the rapacity and
brutal power exercised by its Amirs. He argues however, that “we might look upon Sinde and
her people in a different light: but these rulers who seized it by the sword must be excused for so
maintaining it. Where the principles of honour are not understood (as has ever been too much
the case in Asiatic governments), men must be ruled by fear; and it is only as the subject gets liberal and civilized, that he can appreciate the advantages of free institutions, and deserves a share
in the government of his country.”113 Like Evans, Burnes suggests that violent force has been
integral to the maintenance of power throughout Asian history. The Amirs of Sindh have applied
cruel techniques by necessity. The general populace of Central Asia is unable to comprehend
more civilized forms of government, and therefore, must be ruled through undisguised force.
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Since in his view Asians are not civilized, or at least not yet, successful governance requires constant violent enforcement. Although a constitutional and “liberal” style of government was appropriate in the metropole, a similar system would be ineffective in controlling India. In order to
rule, the Indian government had to clearly demonstrate their military capabilities and their political will to use them.

3.3 The Indian Army and British Prestige
The sheer magnitude of the territorial and demographic scope of India made it extraordinarily valuable, yet difficult to control. Edward Ingram explains that “the Indian Empire was the
most valuable piece of property owned by the British. The Indian Army was meant to keep it in
order, but as the effectiveness of the army depended upon the prestige of the British, it was a
symbol rather an instrument of power.”114 Ingram goes on to argue that “the Great Game was
planned as an offensive which might help the British to avoid the price of their military weakness. The British were not well equipped in the early nineteenth century to repulse an invasion
of India, brush off a feint at invasion, or put down a rebellion.”115 Together, these statements
make several arguments that are critical to understanding British policy in India. First, Ingram
makes it clear that India, especially after the American Revolution, had become a vital part of the
British Empire. It offered a giant market for British goods, mass stores of wealth and resources,
and extensive untapped potential. Therefore, maintaining control of this possession was of strategic importance. Second, he challenges the notion that Britain was already the dominant European and global power by the late eighteenth century. He suggests that, especially at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British were relatively weak. Third, he argues that British
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prestige and the perceived capabilities of the Indian Army were more important than their actual
ability to project, deploy, and execute military force. The representation of unmatched strength
was meant to manage foreign and local rivals without actually engaging in combat. Military
prestige was critical to British control in India.
British prestige was meant to control local rulers and counter the perceived internal threat
of turmoil and rebellion. The Indian government hoped that fear of the unvanquished capability
of their Army, and the corollary of inevitable defeat for any challenger would deter local intrigue. M.E. Yapp contends that the greatest weapon the Indian government had against internal
turmoil was prestige. “If Indian enemies of British power believed that revolt was foredoomed
to failure they would be less inclined to make the attempt. Accordingly, it was vital that the Raj
should never be defied and never beaten but should always present an impression of confident,
overbearing power.”116 The Indian government had to present an image of a dominant and unrivaled force in South Asia. However, this was especially challenging due to British demographic
weakness and the consequent need to maintain the support of local intermediaries. Military
spectacle was a potential strategy for demonstrating British power under these constraints. According to Scott Myerly, “for any state struggling to maintain control and authority in situations
where its forces are insufficient for the task, as was the case in Great Britain, the manipulation of
visual images is especially significant in the exercise of power.”117 Military spectacle was such
an effective tool for subduing turmoil due to its ability to intimidate rebels and rivals.118 In order
to assert British power and prestige, the Indian government sought the opportunity to perform on
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the Asian stage. This desire was increasingly pressing since Britain was not the only European
power in Asia.
Immediately preceding the invasion of Afghanistan, the Indian government believed that
their prestige was waning in relation to Russia. It was feared that if Russia became the predominant power in Central Asia, native rulers and peoples would rise up against their British overlords. This fear was clearly expressed by Mohan Lal:
there was no doubt that the Russian name and influence was materially injurious to British interests even as far as to the eastern side of the Indus. The rumours of the power and
bravery of the Russians, exaggerated by distance and talked of in Oriental style as it
passed from one person to another, had given ample reason for restlessness in the minds
of the discontented chiefs of India. This was indeed not limited to Mahomedans only, but
extended to the Rajput chiefs also of that country and every one of them was looking
forward with anxiety for the expected reverses of the English. Tired of tranquility, and
aspiring and longing for that pomp which all Asiatics enjoy during public confusion, they
were whispering their wishes and preparing themselves to be ready at a moment’s call,
and to throw off the mask of quiet discontent against the rule of the British government.119
There were several main causes of British anxiety. First, he contends that British and Russian
prestige were relational. As Russian influence in Central Asia rose, it directly reduced British
authority. Second, he suggests that local populations saw Russia as the rising power in the region. He presents an extremely ominous situation. Russian power is seen to be rising, and the
stories and rumours told at the bazaar are compounding their perceived strength. This image of
Russian ascendancy grew every day that Britain did not take action to prove otherwise. Third,
Lal directly links perceptions about Russian power to Indian turmoil. Local rulers see the AngloRussian rivalry as an opportunity to cast off the shackles of British power. If the British are engaged in a conflict with Russia, they will be unable to maintain their Indian possessions. Finally,
the reduction of British prestige presents an immediate and critical threat. In Lal’s telling, Indian
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subjects had already begun preparing for the coming revolt. The rioters and rebels stood ready to
act at a moment’s notice. Lal makes it clear that, if the British do not restore their prestige, their
authority might be lost forever. The time for action was fast approaching.
It was feared that the siege of Herat and Russian intrigue in Kabul might present local
rulers with their desired opportunity to revolt. B.D. Hopkins argues that “when the Burnes mission failed in early 1838, the British felt forced to act not because of its economic interests, but
because of the political loss of prestige and concurrent political ramifications.”120 British prestige was rapidly dissipating by the day. Action was necessary and had to be taken forthwith to
save British power in India. Lieutenant General Sir John Keane, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army of the Indus, proclaimed that the invasion’s success was of the utmost importance because
“the eyes of India will be upon us.”121

3.4 The Pedagogy of Sindh
The invasion of Afghanistan was a pedagogical tool from start to finish. The Indian government’s desire to teach local rulers the importance of submitting to British power was central
to their overall war plans and strategy. In order to ensure this lesson was successfully conveyed,
the British followed a specific invasion route and pursued a series of objectives. The first stage
of the invasion took place in Sindh, which forms part of Pakistan today. While the proclaimed
primary objective of the war was to supplant Dost Mohammad Khan in Kabul, Keane expressed
the importance of showcasing British power throughout the northwest borderlands of British India in the 1830s. He also made it clear that the overall success of the invasion was dependent
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upon each ruler recognizing British primacy. In a letter to General Sir Henry Fane, Commanderin-Chief of India, he expressed the importance of subduing resistance in Sindh prior to advancing
on Afghanistan. In order to ensure success, he requested “a brigade of infantry, two regiments of
cavalry, and troop of horse artillery, should be sent down as early as possible as, until it seems to
me, from the unexpected turn affairs have taken, to be of the utmost consequence that we should
do the thing effectually in Sinde, because the eyes of India will be upon us, and so much depends
on our success in the stake we hold upon the game.”122 Prior to this letter, Fane was directing
Keane to march on Afghanistan without the capitulation of Sindh. Keane took issue with this
order and argued instead the importance of controlling the entire invasion route. Sindh must be
subdued by the Army of the Indus to bolster British prestige in two respects. First, success in
Sindh was necessary teach the Amirs to respect British power. Second, it would demonstrate that
the British had the capability to control the entire region, not just Sindh or Afghanistan.
Keane sought a military engagement in Sindh prior to negotiating a treaty with the Amirs.
This desire was based on the real objective underlying the invasion of Afghanistan, subduing local rulers through a demonstration of British military force. In his message to Lord Auckland, he
reported that
the Ameers seem to have made up all their difference, and to have collected a mass of
Beloochees, called an army, from all quarters, to their assistance. It is impossible from
any information I have yet received, to estimate the number now at the capital, but it is
probably not less than 20,000. They are all armed in their way, and consider themselves
the most warlike and the best soldiers in the world, and the members believe, or pretended to believe, the same thing. It will, therefore, be necessary to teach them a lesson, and
our latest information is that they are now crossing the river with the Ameers at their
head, and brining twelve pieces of artillery mounted, to give us battle. I sincerely hope it
may be so, and it signifies not what their numbers may be against even my small, well
equipped, and disciplined force, as I shall attack them without hesitation.123
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Keane genuinely hopes for a battle en route to Hyderabad. This encounter would teach the
Baluchis to respect the Indian army. Even though Keane was outnumbered, he was certain that
the barbarian forces assembled by the Amirs were no match for his army. While he knew that an
insurmountable gap existed between the organizational and technological capabilities of the two
armies, his enemy did not. The Baluchis believed themselves to be not only equal to the British,
but stronger. Keane sought to revise this irrational notion through force of arms. While these
two forces never met on the battlefield, the Amirs were still forced to yield to British power.
The threat and display of military force was utilized to negotiate the terms of the uneven
treaty between Sindh and the East India Company. On February 4, 1839, Henry Pottinger, the
Resident in Sindh, sent a report to the Private Secretary of the Governor General discussing his
negotiations with the Amirs of Sindh. He makes it clear that intimidation was one of his primary
tactics during these talks. He states that “the fort at Kurachee fired one or two guns at the
‘Wellesley’ when the reserve went there. The Admiral brought his broadside to bear on it, and it
is stated he has leveled it with the dust. I have sent to the Ameers to say, that if they ‘shake their
lip,’ Sir John Keane shall do so by Hyderabad, and I will insist on the removal of every person in
authority from Kurachee who is now there, before I bring away the reserve. It will teach these
savages to pay due respect to the British flag in time to come.”124 Pottinger uses the impending
arrival of Keane and his force at Hyderabad to force the Amirs to accept British terms. He employs the devastation of Karachi to prove the capability of British arms. By destroying the fort at
Karachi, the “Wellesley” openly showcased British muscle. In order to avoid a similar fate, the
Amirs of Sindh were forced to submit. This message is further connected to the objective in Kabul. Pottinger tells the Amirs that if they refuse to acquiesce, that he will remove them from
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their posts. Through this threat, Pottinger suggests that the British have the right to act as kingmakers in Central Asia. This engagement is also meant to have permanent effects. Pottinger
hopes that the destruction of Karachi will make the Amirs more compliant in the future. Indeed,
the bombardment and the threat of further action produced the desired results.
The British believed that they had successfully taught the inhabitants of Sindh and their
rulers an important lesson according to Pottinger in his memorandum to the Secretary of the
Governor General. He makes it clear that British power had forced the Amirs of Sindh to accept
British demands and treaty stipulations. During the negotiations, he
begged them all to look back, particularly to the important events of the last six months,
and reflect, if they had the slightest cause to question our fair dealing and desire to keep
on good terms with them. I said, that they had themselves literally imposed on us the necessity of dictating the arrangements provided for by the late treaty; and that they must
henceforth consider Sinde to be (as it was in reality) a portion of Hindoostan, in which
our position was paramount, and entitled us to act as we considered best and fittest for the
general good of the whole empire. Noor Mahomed Khan in person, and the different
deputations from the other Ameers, admitted the truth of my observations. They said
their ‘eyes had been opened,’ that they had been taught their experience of our strength
and good faith; their wavering had arisen more from ignorance than design, that they
judged of us as they would have done of each other; that they now saw their error, and
were most solicitous to rectify it.125
By deploying the Army of the Indus, the East India Company was able to bring Sindh under British influence. It was also able to open the navigation of the Indus to British merchants. By
marching the army through Sindh, the Indian government greatly increased British prestige in the
country. They were also able to prove their ability to shape Asian politics however they saw fit.
The submission of Sindh ensured that the Army of the Indus’s march through Asia had broad and
far reaching effects.
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3.5 The Lessons of Ghazni
The only major battle in the First Anglo-Afghan War took place at the fortress of Ghazni.
This engagement provided Keane an opportunity to accomplish the two overarching objectives
of the invasion, to assert British dominance in Central as well as South Asia and secure Shah
Shuja’s placement on the throne in Kabul. The stronghold of Ghazni was believed to be impregnable throughout Central Asia. This reputation made it the ideal site of Keane’s lesson. During
the invasion of Afghanistan, Mohan Lal served as a cultural adviser to Keane and other leading
British officers. Lal highlights the perceived strength of the fortress when he states that, the
Governor of Ghazni “Sardar Haidar Khan considered, moreover, the stronghold of Ghazni was
never to be subdued by force of arms, and that when we were reduced in our supplies, and unable
to maintain ourselves amidst the wrathful fanatics, the victory will result in favour of the garrison.”126 Ghazni was seen as invincible by its local defenders. Due to his position, the Governor’s confidence in the strength of his fortress should be expected. This opinion was shared by
local leaders. On the march from Kandahar to Ghazni, “Haji Khan Kakar, as well as Haji Dost
Mohammed Khan, with other petty chiefs, hung back by slow marches to avoid their appearance
in our camp, and to wait the result of our advance upon Ghazni.”127 The theory that the fortress
would be capable of halting the British march is apparent in the actions of these local chieftains.
Even though Kandahar had already surrendered to the Army of the Indus without incident, these
leaders still did not rally around the British flag. To them, the outcome of the British invasion
was still uncertain. In their view the fortress of Ghazni offered a formidable hurdle. If the Indian army failed at Ghazni, the march on Kabul might have been halted and Dost Mohammad
Khan would have remained the Afghan sovereign. Thus the local chiefs avoided joining a side
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until they were certain of the invasion’s outcome. Their hesitancy demonstrates the local expectation that the stronghold could not be easily captured. This knowledge was shared by both sides
of the encounter.
The capture of Ghazni further demonstrated that placing Shah Shuja on the throne was
not the only objective of the Army of the Indus. The fortress represented a significant hazard. If
the storming party failed, the march on Kabul would have been seriously crippled. Shah Shuja
recognized this concern and advocated avoiding the fort altogether. According to Major William
Hough, “the Shah took a different view of the case, he thought that, in our peculiar situation, we
could not take the place with our present ordnance; and his advice was to leave the fort behind
and march on for Cabool.”128 Several aspects of the Shah’s counsel warrant attention. First, his
desire to avoid Ghazni underlines the perceived strength of the fortress. He believed that it could
not be easily taken and that a British victory was not certain. Second, the fact that the Shah was
either ignored or overridden suggests that Keane had other objectives in storming Ghazni. If the
invasion was only meant to place Shuja on the throne, this battle and its location presented an
unnecessary risk. It is likely that the success of the invasion would require an eventual engagement between the British and the Afghans. Forcing the battle to take place at Ghazni does not
appear to be the most prudent option. Challenging the Afghans at their stronghold was meant to
demonstrate the overwhelming power of British arms. If the British could defeat the Afghans
even where they possessed the defensive advantage, there would be no doubt about the disparity
between British and local power.
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The real strength and symbolic value of Ghazni was clearly articulated by the military
planners of the Indian army. Keane was fully informed of the view of locals that Ghazni was an
unconquerable fortress. He was also aware that these assumptions were held throughout Central
Asia, not just Afghanistan. The fall of Ghazni would demonstrate the indisputable power of
British arms, and would therefore, teach a lasting lesson. After capturing Ghazni, he wrote to
Auckland informing him “that the army under my command have succeeded in performing one
of the most brilliant acts it has ever been my lot to witness during my service of 45 years, in the
four quarters of the globe, in the capture, by storm, of the strong and important fortress and citadel of Ghuznee yesterday. It is not only that the Afghan nation, and I understand, Asia generally,
have looked upon it as impregnable, but it is in reality a place of great strength, both by nature
and art.”129 He makes it clear that the fall of Ghazni was a critical event in the East India Company’s military and diplomatic history. He goes on to say that the “brilliant triumph we have obtained, the cool courage displayed, and the gallant bearing of the troops I have the honour to
command, will have taught such a lesson to our enemies in Affghan nation, as will make them
hereafter respect the name of a British soldier.”130 By quickly seizing the citadel, the Army of
the Indus had visibly exhibited British capabilities. The overwhelming success, culminating in
the British flag flying over the citadel, broadcast the Army’s success to their enemies throughout
Asia. This victory was to have lasting effects throughout the region. Unlike the immediate objective of supplanting Dost Mohammad Khan, the Army was attempting to ensure the long-term
tranquility and submission of Central Asia. Keane adamantly believed that this dramatic victory
would produce this desired state of affairs.
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The immediate results of the fall of Ghazni signaled that Keane’s action had accomplished its objective. The British victory was quickly followed by local chieftains officially recognizing Shah Shuja’s claim to the throne. According to Lal, “one day after the capture of
Ghazni, Haji Khan Kakar, along with Haji Dost Mohamed Khan and the other Durrani chiefs,
who had designedly hung back from our camp on a former occasion, began now to a new course
of conduct, as I have noticed previously; but now they opened their tongues for flattery, showering the flowers of praise on our soldiers, which indeed, they really deserved; and said that no one
had ever thought in Afghanistan of our capturing the stronghold of Ghazni in such a short time,
and that therefore they did not hurry themselves to join our camp.”131 The victory at Ghazni
proved to the local chieftains that the British were now the predominant power in the country.
They quickly joined the Shah’s entourage in order to ensure that they were seen as allied to the
new sovereigns of the country. This statement also expresses the rapid increase in British prestige. Local leaders did not expect the Indian army would conquer their country, or at least not as
quickly as they did. The stunning pace of the invasion overturned local suppositions about British military capabilities. It was now devastatingly clear that submission was more desirable than
challenging the British. According to the report sent from Auckland to the Secret Committee of
the East India Company, the crushing defeat also led to Dost Mohammad Khan abandoning his
army and abdicating the throne.132 The British took these signs as proof of their success and
their rising power throughout Central Asia.
The fall of Ghazni and its repercussions were seen as critical to maintaining British India
and asserting British prestige in the region. The importance of these events was clearly ex-
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pressed by the top officials of the East India Company. According to Auckland’s letter to Keane
on August 26, 1839,
had the force assembled by Dost Mohammed at Urghundee, to oppose the advance of
your Excellency’s army, maintained its position till its arrival there, I cannot entertain a
doubt that a glorious triumph would have awaited the British arms; and that one more example would have been given to the people of Affghanistan, and the surrounding countries, of the superior discipline and valour of the forces under your Excellency’s command. But your Excellency must have felt the satisfaction of reflecting, that the defection
which took place among the followers of Dost Mohammed, and his precipitate flight,
though evincing the influence already exercised by the approach of the legitimate sovereign, were attributable, in no small degree, to the conviction which they had learned to
entertain the hopelessness of resistance against such distinguished skill and prowess as
had, a few days before, led the British army in triumph into the citadel of Ghuznee and it
is to be hoped that the measure which has been accomplished of restoring this prince to
the throne of his ancestors will be productive to peace and prosperity in the country over
which he rules, and will confirm the just influence of the British government in the regions of Central Asia.133
In this letter, Auckland expresses several critical points that suggest that the primary objective of
the invasion transcended the Kabul throne. First, the storming of Ghazni served as unmistakable
proof of British power and the reach of this power beyond the borders of Afghanistan. He hoped
that the peoples in all the surrounding countries would take notice of this striking victory. Second, he argues that this success will prevent turmoil in the future. The elevation of British prestige made challenging their power a hopeless operation. Resistance would be useless, and the
British would be able to maintain their influence in the region without having to subdue further
instances of turmoil. Finally, he believed that the lesson of Ghazni would validate Britain’s influence throughout the region. By triumphantly placing Shah Shuja on the throne, the Company
had proven their ability to not only influence rulers but to determine who was fit to rule each territory in the region. If local rulers wanted to maintain their authority, it was incumbent upon
them to accept British demands. If they refused to submit, they would be replaced by a more
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compliant intermediary. The storming of Ghazni was a trophy victory that the British hoped
would “add a fresh lustre to the reputation of the armies of India.”134

3.6 Dethroning God
Religion played a central role in the life and politics of Afghanistan. Various leaders in
the country attempted to employ Islam to advance their claims to power. It was also used as a
way of unifying disparate groups throughout the country against a common foe. According to
B.D. Hopkins, “Islam provided the Afghan socio-political universe the conceptual language with
which to describe its non-tribal neighbours who stood outside the agnatic normative order. It
therefore served as the medium of communication, and at time an idiom of confrontation, for interacting with those people. As Afghans increasingly found themselves faced with hostile and
powerful non-Muslim foreign powers, leaders employed the language of Islam to rally tribesmen
as well as de-legitimize first Sikh and later British encroachment.”135 The Afghan political environment was a relatively decentralized, if not fractured system. Different groups maintained
their local independence, and at most, rendered partial recognition to a central ruler. While there
was significant local difference, Islam provided a language that could unify these often rival
groups. Through this language, a foreign power could be presented as a threat to the religious
community as a whole, rather than to an individual tribe or leader. Consequently the British saw
Islam as a means of inciting local resistance and producing violent turmoil on the frontiers of India.
The political exploitation of Islam was vital to the rule of Dost Mohammed Khan. Since
the Barukzye family did not possess the historical claim to the throne, hereditary right could not
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be used to legitimize his rule. He attempted to overcome this limitation by using Islam to justify
his claims. He “adopted the Arabic title amir, in lieu of the more traditional Persian title
shah.”136 This decision clearly demonstrated his desire to assert his religious claim to the throne,
since this title, amir al-mu’minin, is usually translated as commander of the faithful. Hopkins
confirms this when he says that “Dost Mohammad therefore attempted to create a new basis of
legitimacy, primarily Islamic in nature. But Dost Mohammad’s efforts to construct a façade of
Islamic legitimacy relied on his weaknesses rather than his strengths. With Afghan realms under
threat from within and without, Dost Mohammad attempted to capitalize on these threats by casting them in religious terms.”137 Dost Mohammad Khan attempted to legitimize his rule by inciting jihad against the British infidels and their puppet, Shah Shuja. The British believed that in
order to successfully dethrone Dost Mohammad Khan that they had to undermine his religious
message. The perceived religious fanaticism and the British desire to undermine it, is prevalent
throughout British war planning and account of the conflict.
Prior to the Battle of Ghazni, Keane recognized the threat posed to his army by what he
saw as religious militants. In his description of the battlefield, he noted the arrival of “two rebel
chiefs of the Ghiljie tribe, men of great influence, viz. Abdool Ruhman and Gool Mohamed
Khan, had joined him (Sardar Haidar Khan) with 1,500 horse, and also a body of about 3,000
Ghayeer from Zeenat, under a mixture of chiefs and moollas carrying banners, and who had assembled on the cry of a religious war, in short, we were in all directions surrounded by the enemy.”138 Keane believed that his enemies were motivated by religious fervor. Rather than just
describing the number of soldiers and types of weaponry, he attempts to provide the motivations
136
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behind their resistance. He suggests that they were led by mullahs rather than military commanders, and that these mullahs were preaching jihad in order to bring these zealots to the field.
In addition, immediately after suggesting that the enemy line is primarily made up of religious
fanatics, he says that his army is surrounded. By inciting jihad, the mullahs had been able to surround the relatively small Army of the Indus. Through Keane’s imagery, an even broader threat
becomes apparent. If mullahs can inflame religious feeling in Ghazni, they can do the same
throughout Central Asia. In order to maintain their control in India and extend their influence
around the region, the British had to show that their power in the battlefield rivaled that of God.
Challenging the faith of the Afghans was critical to the Indian army’s success. Prior to
storming the fort and capturing the citadel, British forces engaged a large formation of cavalry on
the surrounding heights. This faction was the same religious force described by Keane. In order
to cut off their route to join in the coming battle, and to undermine the faith of the defenders,
Captain James Outram, Keane’s military Aide-de-Camp, led an attack on their position. He described this attack and its outcome in his war journal. He recounts that
step by step we thus at last attained the loftiest peak, over the crest of which floated the
holy banner of green and white, the largest and most conspicuous in the ranks of the host,
the first unfurling of which by the Moslem High Priest, who had preached a crusade
against the British, had called together a mob of fanatics, who judging from their reckless
personal exposure must have been deceived into the belief that they were safe under the
charm of its sacred influence. Towards this objective we made our way, ascending a very
precipitous acclivity under a smart fire, from which we were sheltered by the rocks, until,
on our arriving within fifty paces of the enemy, a fortunate shot brought down the standard-bearer. The whole of our party then rushing up with a great cheer, the banner was
seized, whilst the enemy, panic-stricken at the proof of the fallacy of their belief, fled
with precipitation.139
Outram’s description of the encounter draws out several important ideas. First, he emphasizes
the religious motivations of his enemy. He contends that the British are being challenged by re139
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ligious-minded rather than kinships – or clientage-based adversaries. Second, these fanatics are
so convinced in the justice of their cause, and its divine support, that they seem oblivious to the
dangers of battle. The unpredictable actions of these soldiers must have appeared as an especially worrying trait to the Indian army. If these individuals believed themselves to be immune to
British force, they would never become docile. In order to force their submission, the British
had to torpedo their faith. Outram and his soldiers had to claim their religious symbol, as a way
of demonstrating its inability to protect them against the British onslaught. As soon as the holy
banner fell, the Afghan defenders fled from the battlefield. Through the capture of the holy banner, and the military stronghold of Ghazni, the British taught their rivals that faith could not save
them from British power. The Army of the Indus actively sought to undermine any source of
strength or symbol of resistance during their march to Kabul.

3.7 The Military Review
Throughout the invasion of Afghanistan, the Army of the Indus employed various military spectacles to showcase British military might and force local submission. The military parade was one of the most frequently utilized of these performances. This type of demonstration
took place at several critical points during the invasion. The military parade was heavily utilized
due to its symbolic meaning and the powerful image it presented. According to Myerly, in the
first half of the nineteenth-century, “the army was still the main vehicle to maintain and restore
order, and it was successful in fulfilling these duties in large part because of the power of military spectacle to awe and intimidate.”140 As Myerly suggests, the military was not only deployed
to win direct engagements with the enemy. The army was equally important because of its abil-
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ity to inspire fear in the mind of potential adversaries. Due to the cost and uncertainty of war, it
was more desirable to force an enemy into submission through pomp and display than actual
combat. The Army of the Indus staged military reviews at every point of the conflict in order to
subdue their Afghan rivals on the invasion route and to demonstrate the power of their force to
the regional audience.
The military review was employed to expedite the treaty negotiation in Sindh. Prior to
the destruction of Karachi and the march of Keane’s reserve force, the Amirs of Sindh attempted
to resist the unequal treaty thrust upon them by the British. At this point, the Amirs had not directly witnessed the size or capabilities of the Indian army. During the negotiations between
General Fane and one of the Amirs of Sindh,
the duly ratified treaty was produced, upon which the Ameer, said he would insist on
Noor Mahomed Ali, of Hyderabad, agreeing to our terms. Sir H. Fane replied, ‘I have
wasted time enough treating: I will now march down, and attack him; and if you like, I
will show you the troops I shall send to do it.’ The review of the Cavalry brigade, and
the 2nd T. 2nd B. Bengals II took place in the evening. The Ameer was astonished at the
Military array, but expressed his fears of seeing the Europeans!141
The threat of military force was used to expedite treaty negotiations. Prior to actually engaging
the Amirs in Hyderabad, Fane demonstrated his strength to the Amir who took part in the negotiations. This display of force was meant to terrify the Amir, and force him to accept the treaty
being discussed. Fane’s action had two important aspects. First, he threatened the Amir with the
use of force. He did not limit his threat to words, however, he showed the Amir the army that
would carry out his intentions. The military performance made Fane’s threat more credible and
imposing. The significance of the review would become increasingly obvious as the Army of the
Indus crossed through the Bolan Pass.
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The British performed a larger and more influential spectacle upon entering Kandahar.
On May 8, 1839, the Army of the Indus staged a military ceremony to recognize Shah Shuja’s
return to the ancient capital of the Durrani Empire. For the ceremony,
the whole of the British army (Bengal and Bombay) was drawn up in a line, at the dawn
of day, in front of the city of Candahar to the North amounting to about 7,500 men. A
platform, or throne, was erected in the midst of an extensive plain. At sunrise, the guns
of the palace announced His Majesty’s departure. The ‘Army of the Indus’ then marched
round, in front of the throne, in review order; the grand ceremony presented an imposing
spectacle. There was about 3 or 4,000 Afghans assembled to view the scene.142
During the military review, only the British army was formed up and marched around the throne.
The Shah’s Afghan forces did not take part in the ceremony. What this arrangement showcased
was British power rather than the combined capabilities of the two forces. Hough also calls his
readers attention to the number of Afghans at the ceremony. Several thousand locals witnessed
the commanding spectacle. While these numbers may seem relatively small, it still produced the
desired effect. The witnesses could quickly pass on impressions of British strength by virtue of
the rapid diffusion of information in Central Asia through the bazaar and trade routes. Lal confirms the British desire to influence more than just the Afghans in attendance. He explains that
the “grand ceremony was not only imposing for form’s sake, but was caused with the view to
awe the Afghans and the Ghilzais, through whose country we had yet to pass on our way to Kabul.”143 Both Hough and Lal make it clear that the military review in Kandahar was enacted with
specific objectives in mind. The British purposefully paraded the entirety of the British Army to
ensure that spectators witnessed its full potential. Locals observed foot soldiers, cavalry, and
artillery. They were exposed to the full European arsenal.
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The military parade also allowed the British to prove their ability to make Afghanistan in
Europe’s image. Upon reaching Kabul, the Army of the Indus orchestrated a Grand Review for
the accession of Shah Shuja.144 Enacting a Grand Review meant that the accession of the Shah
was enacted through European imagery. According to Myerly, “grand reviews were usually held
in conjunction with some major event, such as the anniversary of a battle, or a royal accession or
birthday, or some other royal celebration, and they often involved great number of soldiers and
spectators.”145 The Army of the Indus celebrated Shah Shuja’s return to the throne in a similar
fashion to royal ceremonies in London. By putting on a performance in Kabul, that had its
meaning and origins in London, the imperial officials connected the two capitals. Like the British monarch, the Afghan ruler was now placed upon his throne, and protected by, British bayonets. The Grand Review reminded the Shah, and all those present, that Britain alone possessed
the ability to choose the Afghan sovereign. The Court of Kabul was now diplomatically and
symbolically connected to London.

3.8 The Communicative Power of Gun Salutes
The Indian government sought to announce their growing prestige throughout the region.
In order to generate as far-reaching results as possible, the British had to ensure that not just
combatants observed their victories, but that it was experienced by all of the peoples it hoped to
dominate. The British utilized gun salutes to broadcast their military victories throughout South
Asia. The gun salute was an established means of communicating power relations and political
prestige by the East Indian Company. It was often used to recognize and rank princely rulers.146
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The local audience’s knowledge of the gun salute and its political meaning made it an ideal tool
for communicating the events in Afghanistan. The British fired guns in both Afghanistan and
India, thus ensuring that the invasion would influence native rulers and peoples throughout the
region.
Gun salutes were fired throughout Afghanistan to celebrate Shah Shuja’s return to the
throne. This recognition was meant to place the Shah on equal footing with other native rulers in
British India. They also publicly declared the Indian government’s right and ability to determine
the sovereign of each territory within their sphere of influence. In addition, the gun salute was
used as a way of rewarding loyalty to the British.147 One of the most important gun salutes took
place upon Shah Shuja’s arrival in Kandahar. Hough recounts this event in his detailed war
journal. He states that on April 25, 1839, he “heard a ‘Royal Salute’ and firing at Candahar, in
honour of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk’s entry into the ancient Dorranee capital of Affghanistan.”148
By firing a “Royal Salute” in Kandahar, the British were making several proclamations to the
surrounding territories. First, they were celebrating the successful and unopposed march of the
Army of the Indus. Second, they were placing Shah Shuja on equal footing with the other native
rulers in India. Through the firing of a “Royal Salute,” as opposed to limiting the number of
rounds to single digits, the British immediately elevated the Shah to a position equal to the most
loyal native rulers. Third, and most importantly, they were announcing the ability of British
arms to place a native ruler of their choice on the ancient thrones of Asia. By firing a “Royal
Salute” in Kandahar, the British seemed to be asserting their control over more than just the current territories controlled by Kabul. Rather, they were proclaiming that all the territories that had
fallen under the Durrani Empire were now under British influence. This territory extended be147
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yond just Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul, and encompassed the entirety of modern day Afghanistan and Pakistan. The British were thus asserting their control over the entirety of the borderlands to the northwest of British India.
The gun salute in Kabul published an equally important message. According to Hough,
upon Shah Shuja’s entry into Kabul, “he was escorted by a troop of Horse Artillery, 1 Squadron
his Majesty’s 16th Lancers, who were paraded in review order in front of the lines, and on the
road leading to Cabool. A royal salute was fired as His Majesty approached the escort, and the
squadrons saluted him as he passed; after which, they wheeled up, and followed in procession to
the entrance of the town, when they were again formed; and where another royal salute was
fired.”149 This display communicated several important ideas. First, the Shah was welcomed
into the Afghan capital by a formation of British soldiers and the firing of British artillery. By
using British arms to announce his welcome, there was no doubt about who was responsible for
his return. The British were making it clear to all those witnessing the event, that they were the
true sovereigns of the country, and that their reach now extended from India to Kabul. This message was further enforced by the second royal salute. Once Shah Shuja had entered his capital,
the army fired again. This seems to have communicated the intent to use British arms to defend
the Shah and to maintain British influence in the capital. The Indian Army was responsible for
the capture of Kabul, and they were now responsible for its defence. The dual firing was meant
to leave no doubt in the minds of local observers about the newly established power relationship
in the country.
Gun salutes recognizing the successes of the Army of the Indus were not limited strictly
to the territories of Afghanistan. Since the Indian government sought to affirm and increase their
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prestige throughout India, they had to declare their success in all their possessions. They also
had to ensure that their message could be easily accessed and understood by both local rulers and
peoples. In order to announce their victories to as many groups as possible, gun salutes were
fired throughout India. After the capture of Ghazni, the Secret Committee of the East India
Company gave a general order on August 18, 1839 commanding “a salute of twenty-one guns
will be fired on the receipt of this intelligence at all the principle stations of the Army in the three
Presidencies.”150 Through this order, the Indian government was ensuring that their power was
announced and experienced by the entire population that inhabited their Indian possessions. The
firing of artillery would have been either witnessed or heard by vast numbers of locals both within and around these stations. Similar orders were given during the capture of Kandahar and Kabul. The Indian government ensured that the native population in India was constantly informed
about the British invasion, and therefore, about its increasing power and prestige in the region.
Through this knowledge, the British sought to make resistance and rebellion seem utterly hopeless.

3.9 Conclusion
The invasion of Afghanistan was meant to increase British prestige throughout India and
Central Asia. By employing a specific invasion route, and the military spectacles performed by
the army along the way, the British presented a clear message to local audiences. The Indian
government proved their ability to easily defeat any army or stronghold in Asia. In addition,
they demonstrated their right to control not only how a sovereign ruled, but who was allowed to
do it. Local rulers were taught that submission and loyalty to the Company was a requirement
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for the maintenance of their rule. The native peoples were shown the absolute hopelessness of
revolt. However, in order for the Indian government to maintain their control in Kabul, their securitizing move now had to be accepted in London.
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4. SECURITIZATION ASCENDANT: THE AUTHORITATIVE DISCOURSE OF
SECURITY IN THE METROPOLE
It is not merely that our armies advanced, upon an adequate emergency, far beyond the frontier
of our empire, have triumphed over the difficulties natural to a mountainous country, inhabited
by fierce and warlike tribes, greatly enhanced by the severe privations to which such a service, at
a vast distance from their resources, necessarily exposed them, and that they have consummated
their glory by planting the standard of England upon the towers of the citadel, from which, more
than eight hundred years before, MAHMOOD of Ghizni, surnamed the Idol-breaker, led out the
wild horsemen of the Steppe of the Caspian to reap the first harvest of Mahomedan spoliation in
the rich bazaars and temples of Hindostan: we shall form a very insufficient estimate of the value
of these gallant achievements, and the merit due to the political wisdom that planned them, unless we contemplate the position in which Lord AUCKLAND stood at the time when he formed
the high resolve of entering upon the avowedly hazardous course, which it has pleased the god of
battles to crown with such entire success.
Morning Chronicle, November, 28 1839
4.1 Introduction
The process of securitization becomes much more effective if a securitizing actor can
elevate the problem of security to the level of an authoritative discourse. In order for security to
gain this power, it must be accepted by more than just the empowering audience. According to
Balzacq,
securitizing agents always strive to convince as broad an audience as possible because
they need to maintain a social relationship with the target individual group. In common
with the desire to transmit information, political officials are responsive to the fact that
winning formal support while breaking social bonds with constituencies can wreck their
credibility. That explains, while seeking formal acquiescence, political officials also
cloak security arguments in the semantic repertoire of the national audience in order to
win support.151
While the empowering audience is the primary target of a securitizing move, securitizing actors
must connect with the entire population. If the securitizing actor alienates the majority of the
populace, they will be unable to claim that their actions were legitimate. Securitizing actors seek
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to craft their message in such a way that it will be persuasive and desirable to the larger public.
By transcending the closed rhetorical space of official politics, securitizing actors are capable of
raising security to the level of an authoritative discourse.
Authoritative discourses are especially powerful due to their ability to shape any corresponding discussions. When an idea becomes an authoritative discourse, it demands recognition
and consent. According to M.M. Bakhtin, an
authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it binds us,
quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us internally; we encounter it
with its authority already fused to it. Its authority was already acknowledged in the past.
It is a prior discourse. It is therefore not a question of choosing it from among other possible discourses that are its equal. It is given in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact. Its language is a special (as it were, hieratic) language. It can be profaned. It is akin
to taboo, i.e., a name that must not be taken in vain.152
As he suggests, certain words become elevated and assume unquestionable influence. Once a
word is accepted as authoritative, it shapes all future dialogues. Discussion is no longer about
whether a subject warrants attention, but how it should be understood. I contend that successful
securitization will result in security becoming an authoritative discourse. If a referent object is
successfully securitized, the debate is no longer about whether the referent object should be protected, but how. Achieving the status of authoritative discourse infuses a notion of security and
its advocates with newfound power and influence.
Raising an idea to the level of an authoritative discourse is supremely beneficial within
policy debates. Its achievement provides its advocates with a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of
the public. However, the need to justify a policy fractures the policymaker’s authority. David
Spurr contends that
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in theory, a clear and fully present authority would never find itself in the position of having to defend itself; there is no demand for proof when a truth is sufficiently authoritative
to be self-evident. Once authority begins to be asserted however, there opens up a split
between assertion and authority itself, in which the latter is revealed as conditional and
contingent on its representation. Affirmations of authority can now be seen as strategic
devices necessary for the maintenance of that authority, rather than a simple manifestation of an unquestioned presence.153

Spurr makes several arguments that are critical to analyzing securitization as an authoritative
discourse. First, he suggests that no authority is ever total. Even when an idea seems to be officially and universally sanctioned, it is merely covering past disputes. This contested nature
means that authoritative discourses have a history, which, can be studied. Second, he argues that
a perceived fact is merely a representation. This representation is not an actual presentation of
facts, but rather, the specific message that an authority seeks to broadcast. Finally, by demonstrating that these images are merely representations, Spurr suggests that they serve as tools of
power. Representations then, whether they are produced by official or unofficial sources, serve
as part of a larger dispositif of power. These image repertoires must be analyzed alongside other
imperial tools.
Threatening representations were vital in justifying the policies pursued by British imperial officials. According to M.E. Yapp, “the British view of India, as expressed in Press and Parliament, was an important constraint upon British Indian policy, or at least upon the ways in
which policies could be discussed. Arguments about the defence of India had to be phrased in a
manner which would not leave room for critics to declare India to be a burden upon Britain.”154
The Indian government was constrained by two specific groups within the metropole. They had
to convince both Parliament and the popular press that British actions on India’s borders were
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justified. In order to analyze their securitizing move, it is necessary to study how it was expressed in both official and unofficial sources. The Indian government had to prove that their
actions were beneficial to Britain, to the metropole and not just the colony. Their policies could
not be a drain upon the imperial purse, and they had to advance Britain’s position in the European balance of power. Yapp goes on to say that the language of security served to bridge the actions of the Indian government to the emotions of the metropolitan audience. Yapp asserts that
“the only strategy which linked all elements in the diverse hierarchies was the strategy based on
the theory of externally-induced, internal disaffection. It offered something to everyone and was
virtually irrefutable.”155 Through the language of security, imperial officials were able to successfully articulate their argument for intervention in Afghanistan.
The metropolitan audience in Great Britain was presented a coordinated assemblage of
“metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, and emotions”156 in order to
justify the invasion of Afghanistan. In this chapter, I argue that the security of India was elevated to the level an authoritative discourse. This ascension was achieved through the presentation
of a specific set of heuristic artefacts in the popular press. These articles were dependent upon
several major themes. They included the appearance of unbiased information favorable to military action, the recognition of the commercial and fiscal value of India, the imminence of an existential threat prior to the invasion, the belief in the need for energetic and prompt action to
counter this menace, and the expectation of positive results following from an invasion. The
press developed the ubiquitous belief that the security of British India was endangered and the
invasion of Afghanistan was necessary.
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4.2 Convincing the Public
Initially, there was limited knowledge in the British metropole about Afghanistan and its
relationship with British India. Military action, however, quickly drew the gaze of the metropolitan public, for the most part business and professional men of the middle class who took an interest in the nation, the empire, and the wider world. The British press attempted to fill this lack
of knowledge with what was presented as unbiased and objective reports. These reports were
dependent upon the knowledge and actions of officialdom. According to Partha Chatterjee, “the
pressure of democratic accountability would force all liberal powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to bring colonial governance under some sort of parliamentary control. Yet it
would always retain its character as a sphere ruled by experts who would demand and enjoy a
degree of autonomy from supervision by an ignorant and uncomprehending metropolitan audience along with its elected representatives.”157 As Chatterjee suggests, the increased role of Parliament in imperial affairs brought the actions of the Indian government under closer scrutiny.
However, due to restricted and asymmetrical access to colonial knowledge, both Parliament and
the public were reliant upon the reports produced by imperial and Indian government officials.
The Indian government was able to present a contrived narrative that legitimized their actions.
The control of colonial knowledge was crucial to asserting its benefits at home.
The press sought to claim a position of objectivity and neutrality on Indian affairs. Since
it was reporting on actual events and utilizing the facts of official documents to corroborate the
truthfulness of their accounts, the press asserted its ability to report reality. According to Spurr,
however, “journalism and other forms of nonfiction, despite conventional expectation, depend on
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the use of myth, symbol, metaphor, and other rhetorical procedures more often associated with
fiction and poetry.”158 Although journalism is generally presented as a fact-based endeavor,
Spurr makes it clear that it is bound by the same rhetorical tools prevalent in other genres. The
press conjures specific images of current events in the minds of its readers. Spurr goes on to say
that “against the background of this daily disintegration, however, the media also presents their
prescription for unity within the context of established institutions, so that ‘policies of corporate
and state authority are played out as visions of unification and order against the general mural of
chaos.’ The rhetorical economy of media creates a demand for images of chaos in order that the
principles of a governing ideology and the need for institutions of order may be affirmed.”159
Several aspects of Spurr’s argument are helpful for analyzing journalism about the First AngloAfghan War. First, the media entrenches the authority of existing governmental institutions.
They are presented as the only practical option for coping with existing chaos. Second, he suggests that journalism consistently produces images of violence and doom. These representations
present a menace that is easily understood and that requires action to counter. Finally, journalism affirms the belief that the government must take action to resolve these issues. In sum, the
press claims to be an objective messenger, and uses this authority to advocate the need for governmental action.
The British press claimed the right to educate the public on the situation in Asia based
upon the metropole’s inconsequential knowledge of the region. The Edinburgh Review states
that even though India is of significant value to Britain, that “British India is almost a terra incognita to the great body of educated Englishmen. Though this little island possesses an empire
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in the East that the Caesars might envy.”160 This statement suggests British imperial possessions
received limited attention in the metropole unless a major event introduced a threat to the prosperity and safety of the country. This belief is confirmed by the Asiatic Journal and Monthly
Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australasia. It states that “Eastern affairs
have rarely taken such firm hold of public attention in this country as during the last few months.
The events beyond the Indus, on the one hand, and in China on the other, deeply affecting our
territorial dominion in India and our commerce in the East, justly claimed that attention which
has been, however, till of late, very reluctantly conceded to Oriental politics.”161 The situation in
Asia rarely received close scrutiny from the literate and educated metropolitan public. This
changed when Britain was drawn into two major conflicts in the East. By the time the demand
was made for information about India and China, however, wars had already commenced. Thus,
we can say that neither members of Parliament or the public were adequately informed about the
situation in Asia prior to the beginning of military action.
Press coverage made it clear that ignorance of Asian affairs prevailed in Parliament as
well as in the public. The press asserted that Parliament had attempted to make determinations
about Indian policy without being adequately educated. Members of Parliament first should have
read the official papers before judging the actions of the Indian government. According to the
Morning Chronicle, “we wish those who so lately joined in denouncing the policy of Lord
AUCKLAND, had awaited the production of the papers just laid upon the table of the House of
Commons by Sir J. HOBHOUSE. At the time, we said the condemnation in the absence of all
evidence was, at least, premature; and it is impossible for any impartial man to read the docu-
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ments without feeling that it has been also grievously unjust.”162

The Examiner seconded this

view telling its readership that some of the peers in the Lords had been “determining upon the
merits of Lord Auckland’s policy in India without hearing either side of the question, or knowing
one syllable about the matter. The papers which have been recently laid before Parliament must
be a terrible blow to these factious assailants, but from their extent it cannot be expected that
many will take the trouble of reading them.”163 Together, these two articles provide crucial insight into the state of colonial information that existed in the metropole. First, they suggest that a
faction of parliamentarians attempted to challenge the Indian government on the invasion. It is
suggested, however, that this faction was not adequately educated about Indian affairs and had
failed to justify its right to judge Auckland’s decision. Second, both articles submit that the Parliamentary Papers on the “Correspondence Related to Affghanistan and the Occupation of
Karrak,” produced on March 26, 1839, gave an accurate account of political realities in Central
Asia prior to the invasion. They contend that these documents must be read and understood prior
to a politician making an informed decision. These documents, however, were produced by the
Indian government and the East India Company Board of Directors. Therefore, the planners of
the invasion exercised considerable influence over how the metropole saw and understood the
geopolitical environment in South and Central Asia. Even though actors with a vested interest in
the war compiled these documents, the information was treated as unbiased and its producers
depicted as experts on the spot. Finally, both of these articles argue that military action was the
only sensible strategy based on the evidence. These articles both attack the credibility of the political opposition, and assert the desirability of the invasion.
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Prior to reporting on the war, the press insisted on the importance of the region. It also
claimed that more attention should be given to the events transpiring across the Indus. The Morning Chronicle explained that “the policy of the Governor-General of India, which, carried into
execution by the energy, endurance, and valour of our troops, has issued in the complete establishment of British ascendancy in Affghanistan, deserves a more comprehensive consideration
than we, or any of our contemporaries, have yet bestowed upon it; for the result is far more important than appears from the surface.”164 This article asserts that further information and coverage about Afghan affairs is critical. The newspaper’s readership must be informed about this
subject, due to its considerable importance. The writer also asserts the desirability of the war by
praising the army. The importance of this subject was further elaborated upon by the Edinburgh
Review. It endeavored to “encourage and facilitate the first steps of public intelligence in the acquisition of knowledge so important and interesting, by laying before our readers a rapid sketch
of the present state and future prospects of our Indian empire.”165 The writer urges readers to
become informed about the important situation in Central Asia. In addition, the writer uses the
term “our” when discussing the Indian empire. The value of territorial expansion is not the concern of only the East India Company. Rather, the use of “our” suggests that the Indian empire is
possessed by all Britons. This ownership requires the metropolitan public be informed about the
empire.
The press claimed the right to make a disinterested judgment about the need for war.
This objectivity is meant to provide them with the authority to shape the minds of their readership. The press claims that they have no interest in the outcome of the invasion and are therefore
capable of providing balanced and reasonable judgment on the military action. Journalists assert
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their disinterestedness prior to presenting the “facts” about the war. The Monthly Review tells
their readership that they will “within a very narrow compass, in a plain and temperate manner,
explain and defend the system of our India Government relative to the parties and the neighbors
who have demonstrated that they cherish a desire to give us annoyance and to encroach upon our
frontier, west of the Indus.”166 The author immediately claims their neutrality and ability to correctly judge the actions of the Indian government. They suggest after viewing the invasion
through an impartial lens, that the actions of the Indian government were just and necessary.
Similar to the Edinburgh Review, this author uses the collective “our.” The empire is of critical
importance to the metropole, not just the Company’s merchants and officials. The claim of detachment is also asserted by the Edinburgh Review. It tells its readers that it “shall endeavor to
form our conclusions upon a calm examination of the points which appear to be at issue; without
suffering ourselves to be dazzled, on the one hand, by the brilliant exploits of our troops; or to
assume, on the other, that Lord Auckland did not take the wisest course which circumstances left
open to him, merely because the course taken may have entailed some undeniable evils upon our
Indian administration.” 167 This article claims the right to dispassionately arbitrate on the events
in India. The article goes on, however, to use the most passionate and fiery language possible to
justify war. This bias is evident even in its claim of neutrality. First, it asserts that the actions of
the troops were “brilliant.” The reader is immediately exposed to the successful nature of the
invasion. The statement suggests that the article will only discuss whether Auckland chose the
correct course of action based upon the situation, which thereby assumes that some type of action
was necessary. If the defence of India had to be pursued, the only question becomes whether the
invasion of Afghanistan was the best choice. With the strategic issue closed, only the matter of
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tactics can be questioned. Thus the press asserted the right to educate the public about threats and
actions without interrogating the fundamentals of the situation.

4.3 The Value of British India
In order to justify action, the Indian government had to prove that British India was worth
the cost of military action beyond its border. At the heart of the question was the fiscal basis of
British rule in India. According to Cain and Hopkins, “a more illuminating approach, we suggest
is to view expansion into India from the mid-eighteenth century as illustrating the extension
abroad of the social forces that dominated the policy at home after 1688. These aims, and the
values that accompanied them, were extended to India: power was to be founded ultimately on
land, and revenue became and remained the central preoccupation of policy, the more so because
India’s role was to be that of a tributary province.”168 As these authors maintain, there was a
clear and intelligible connection between metropolitan and colonial notions of land, wealth, and
power. Britons understood that the value of land underpinned the wealth of a society and the
power of a state, not least because of the revenue collected from a given territory. Even trade and
industry depended ultimately on the richness of the land. Thus the value of India could be appreciated by a British audience. Indeed, according to M.E. Yapp, support for the British presence in
India and the benefits to be gained grew between 1830 and 1850.169 This outlook, encouraged by
the press, disposed the metropolitan public to view positively the moves toward war in Afghanistan.
The commercial and fiscal value of India was used to mobilize support in favor of British
rule and development of the country and surrounding region. The press made a point to empha168
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size the profits as well as products flowing from India. The Edinburgh Review claimed that
“many of our fellow-countrymen may care little about the friendship or hostility of the barbarous
monarchs whose territories border with our Indian possessions; or whether the revenue of those
possessions be wasted in unprofitable war, or employed to the best advantage in creating and extending the blessing of peace. But there are numbers who, if once thoroughly aware of their value, would not be so indifferent to openings for commercial enterprise, and to field where nothing
is wanting but the funds and energy of the British capitalists to ensure large and cheap returns of
the most valuable products.”170 The author suggests that many Britons were unaware of the
stakes in the borderlands. This indifference would quickly turn to interest if they were aware of
its commercial value. The potential profits to be made in this region should awaken British capitalists from their ignorance. In addition, the author presents the rulers of Central Asia as “barbarous.” This statement presents them as illiberal and unenlightened about the progress of civil
societies and market economies. If the lands under their rule can be opened up, British capitalists can develop them. The Edinburgh Review goes on to claim that the “the agriculture, and the
commerce of India, are both as yet in their infancy. There is no limit, at least none that will be
reached for centuries, to her power of supplying the great staples.”171 India is presented as a
source of great agricultural and commercial potential, likely to yield economic benefit for centuries. This long-term value raises the stakes of British control in the short-term.
The land revenue produced by India was also of critical importance to the greater British
empire. After decades of expansion, a large portion of India was under either direct or indirect
British control. These territories produced vast sums of revenue for the British. The Edinburgh
Review informs its readers that “the territorial possessions of these forty-one, and other petty un170
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named states, are estimated to amount to 449,845 square miles: and their annual revenue is calculated at £12,500,000.”172 This source of revenue must be maintained and defended. In addition, by showing that territorial expansion was fiscally advantageous, it can be deduced that further expansion is beneficial. If the Indian government could add territory to their already massive holdings, the annual income would continue to increase. Therefore, the costs of invasion
seem like a small price to pay for the anticipated benefits of security.
Asia presented a new location for European rivalries to be contested. British colonial and
foreign policy in India and Central Asia were significantly influenced by the European balance
of power.173 Maintaining control of India was critical to ensuring that Britain did not lose
ground in relation to any of its European rivals. Placing colonial policy within the language of
European rivalry made it easily accessible to a metropolitan audience. It also significantly increased India’s strategic importance to Britain. The Quarterly Review presented the correlation
between European and Asian politics when it explained that “the questions now pending between
the British Government and the sovereigns and chiefs of the countries which intervene between
the Russian frontier in Georgia and the north-west frontier of British India, derive their real importance from the relative positions of England and Russia. They are therefore not merely Asiatic questions, but are likewise essentially European.”174 The importance of the interactions between the Indian government and local rulers was not limited to the region. Each of these relationships directly influenced the relational power between Britain and Russia. The zero sum nature of the balance of power made these relationships especially important. Every time a local
ruler chose Russian influence in their territory, it reduced the overall power of Britain. Every

172

Ibid., 360.
Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan, 4.
174
“Russia, Persia, England,” Quarterly Review, June 1839, 80.

173

80

action in both Europe and Asia altered the balance between these two powers. It Britain lost
prestige in Asia; it would become progressively weaker in Europe. Maintaining control of India
was critical, therefore, to Britain’s power in Europe. Policy in the East and in the West was intertwined. This belief was echoed in the Edinburgh Review. It asserted that ignorance of Indian
affairs “cannot last. India is rapidly acquiring commercial importance, which must command
attention; and recent events have so intimately connected some of her political relations with
those of Europe.”175 India was vital to British power both commercially and politically. Thus,
its security and survival was of the utmost importance to both metropolitan and imperial actors.

4.4 The Imminent Threat
The press propagated the belief that British India faced an imminent and existential
threat. However, this threat was not limited to a specific frontier or country. The press produced
the anxiety that India was surrounded on all sides by hostile powers. It was also argued that the
combination of these threats produced the strategic environment that the Indian government had
to act within. According to the Morning Chronicle,
to duly appreciate the issue of the struggle, we must look still more closely at the dark
combination of circumstances under the depressing gloom of which Lord AUCKLAND
was obliged to choose his course of policy. On the one hand, Persia had been incited first
to slight the counsel of our ambassador; then grossly to insult him; and finally, in spite of
his remonstrances, to seize upon territory – affording an advanced point d’appui for the
intrigues of Russia – in the direction of the north-western frontier. On the other side, the
Courts of Nepal and Ava, smarting under humiliation and loss of possessions, to which
they were severally subjected at the close of their former contest with the British power,
assumed an extremely threatening aspect.176
British India was encircled by hostile powers. This menacing reality was presented as the context that shaped Auckland’s decision calculus prior to the invasion. He was not faced with mere175
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ly a hostile threat beyond the Indus, but on his southern and southeastern frontiers as well. The
Morning Chronicle went on to explain that the “jealous powers upon our eastern and southeastern frontiers had been taught, or had learned, that they possessed a natural ally in our powerful northern enemy; and that the more intelligent, at least, of the many discontented spirits which
must necessarily exist in an empire held by such a tenure as that of India had begun to look fondly for the vanguard of that invincible army, before which their English rulers were to fly in terror
to their ships.”177 Not only was India threatened by Asian rivals, but there was the possibility
that its hostile neighbors would join forces. The threat of encroaching enemies on every frontier
was magnified by the threat of internal revolt. The newspaper contends that British control was
contested by the local population, which would rise up if they knew an invading army was engaging British forces. The combination of these threats raised the specter of defeat and withdrawal from India.
The broad and severe nature of the threat was presented by other periodicals as well. The
Edinburgh Review informed its readers of “the hostile attitudes assumed by the powers upon our
north-eastern, eastern, and south-eastern frontiers, at the very time that the cloud was gathering
most darkly in the north-west, in order that our readers might form an adequate conception both
of the effect which such an apparent combination of enemies was calculated to produce upon the
excitable minds of our native subjects, and of the circumstances under which it became necessary for Lord Auckland to choose his line of policy with regard to the affairs of Affghanistan and
Persia.”178 Like the piece in the Morning Chronicle, this article focuses on each of India’s hostile neighbors. It makes it clear that in order to gauge the importance and success of the Afghan
policy, India must be placed in a larger regional context. Auckland did not make a decision with
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only Afghanistan and Persia in mind. Rather, he had to develop a strategy that would be effectual throughout South and Central Asia. This article also draws the reader’s attention to the internal threat. The encroachment of any of these powers was likely to energize challenges among
Britain’s Indian subjects. Finally, this article makes the claim that it was “necessary” for Lord
Auckland to make a decision. Due to the amalgamation of these different threats, some type of
action had to be taken. Together, these arguments make it clear to the reader that the Indian government faced an extremely ominous situation, and that military force was the only adequate solution.
The press also exploited British anxiety about Islam. The fear of a Muslim force defeating the British in Asia was an easily recognizable and pressing concern in the metropole. According to Edward Said, “not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the
demonic, hordes of hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma.”179 Islam became
the most threatening image of the other in the minds of Europeans, including the British. The
British press utilized this fear in journalistic descriptions of the situation in India. The religious
nature of the conflict became a central trope in several articles. The Morning Chronicle explained that Persian influence on India’s frontiers would incite “the turbulent Mahomedan population of our large towns. The latter again, with their millions of brethren throughout the Peninsula, bearing towards their Christian masters the most intense religious animosity, exacerbated
by the loss of that temporal domination over the fair provinces of India which we have wrested
from them, were looking impatiently for the coming of the Persian monarch, with the allied or
subjected chiefs of Affghanistan, to re-establish in pristine splendour the fading glories of
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ISLAM. Generally the most feverish excitement prevailed.”180 The threat of Islam was internal
and external due to the large Muslim population in India. If Indian Muslims united against the
British, they would represent a formidable force. The author also suggests that the interreligious
conflict has been a constant theme in Indian politics. The British gained control of their Indian
possessions by defeating Muslim rulers. While Islam’s great days were believed to be in the
past, they remained an inspiration to challengers in the present.
The threat is compounded by the perceived deep seated hatred that the Muslim population harbors against the British. If the combined Persian and Russian forces could reach the Indus, it was feared that the animosity of the Muslim population would violently explode. The Edinburgh Review informs its readers that “as long as they [the millions of Muslims of all classes in
India] retain their present creed, we never can have any hold upon their affection. They hate us
with all the intensity of combined political and religious animosity. They detest us as the subverters of their domination over the fair plains and wealthy cities of Hindostan: they detest us
with all still greater cordiality as the Christian rulers of the followers of the last true Prophet.
They regarded his [the Persian Shah] march upon India with the same fond aspirations which the
Christians of Palestine and Syria must have breathed for the success of the monarchs who led the
third crusade.”181 This article presents an especially threatening concern. It argues that the antipathy that existed between the Muslim population and the British is both ancient and permanent. This type of malice and resentment is used to justify action by the Indian government. The
disagreements between these groups are not limited to political misunderstanding, but stems
from a primordial hatred. The only way, apparently, to challenge this enemy is by force of arms.
By alluding to the Crusades, events in faraway India are brought rhetorically closer to the famil180
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iar historical and cultural world of the metropolitan audience. The Indian government’s worries
can be paralleled to an older European fear of Islam.
The next threat that is presented in these sources is the rising power and influence of Russia in Central Asia. It is feared that the Russian army enjoys higher prestige throughout the region than the British. An ascendant Russia is especially threatening to British control in India
when viewed through the European balance of power paradigm familiar to the metropolitan audience. The Quarterly Review alerted its readers that “the Persian envoy at Kandahar had expatiated on the intimacy and the concert that existed between Persia and Russia, contrasting the high
value of an alliance with these two powers with the comparative worthlessness of a connection
with England and extolling the military power of Russia as superior to that of all other nations.”182 It was believed that Persia was already little more than a Russian pawn. This article
suggests that power was relative in Asia. An alliance with Britain is inconsequential opposed to
the combined forces of Persia and Russia. Every time a local ruler entered willingly or unwillingly into a relationship with Russia, the threat to British India exponentially increased. This
author notes Russian military prestige in the region. Rumors had begun to circulate about Russia’s growing and mythically invincible army which the British believed were being spread
throughout Central Asia. The Edinburgh Review contended that
of the military power of the Russians, the most extravagant notions were entertained.
Wonderful things were asserted of the Oroos [Russians], particularly about their military
deeds. Shumsoodeen Khan, among other things, told the company that no fort could hold
out against this people. The General-e-Oroos gave orders that fifty thousand men should
be killed, and served out as rations! An old Affghan gentlemen in the audience [stated],
“why then they are cannibals, and must have a larger army than Timour had.’ We may be
sure that such tales lose nothing of the marvelous as they travel towards the East.183
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The Russians are seen as bloodthirsty and unstoppable. With rumors like these loose in the region, not just in Afghanistan but India as well, it is feared that native groups will join the Russians rather than suffer their brutality. These rumors had to be offset by stories of British strength
and beneficence.
Finally, the British press confirmed the reality of the Russian peril. The actions of the
Russian were no longer clandestine and their strategic aims were blatantly evident. The Quarterly Review informed its readers that “the concert of Persia and Russia in their proceedings in
Affghanistan had ceased to be doubtful, and the hostile views towards England, with which the
Russian agents were prosecuting this scheme of concerted action with Persia, had been exposed
in the correspondence of Dost Mahommed Khan’s agent at the court of Persia with his master.
The nature of these hostile views will be made more intelligible by the following letter from
Captain Burnes.” 184 The Quarterly Review asserted its credibility as a source of information
about distant developments by citing a letter from Alexander Burnes. The authenticity of these
claims was not a matter of speculation. Rather, they came from what the Briton on the spot had
witnessed. The potential of an impending conflict with Russia over India was no longer in question; it was now the reality that Britons at home had to accept. With the value of India established, and the imminence of a threat verified, immediate and decisive action was believed to be
necessary.

4.5 The Call for Immediate and Decisive Action
The combination of external aggression and internal revolt prompted the Indian government to take action. The information provided to metropolitan audiences indicated a situation
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where direct action was the only solution. Asia was represented as a combustible region, and
one that required British management. According to James Hevia, “the theory and practice of
security, in turn, constituted Asia as a problem, one that demanded and justified interventions of
many kinds. Put another way, the British imperial security regime constituted Asia as an unstable
terrain occupied by suspect populations.”185 Together, the press as well as the government constructed a specific representation of Asia. The entire region was seen as an anarchic and violent
space. It was believed that the subcontinent was inhabited by hostile and barbarous groups who
were not to be trusted. The only way that these groups could be controlled was through direct
military action. The popular press spread these notions throughout the metropole. It not only
informed the domestic audience about the nature of the threat, but also argued that action was
necessary to subdue it.
The necessity for action was immediately presented after the Indian Papers were laid before Parliament. The Indian Papers consisted of selected correspondence between the Indian
government and both local rulers and East India Company Board of Directors. The Morning
Chronicle praised Auckland and his actions almost immediately after these documents were received. On April 8, 1839, it asserted that “from the voluminous correspondence relating to the
affairs of Affghanistan which we find amongst these papers, it is fully and incontrovertibly
proved, not only that Russian emissaries were successfully intriguing in Persia and at Herat, but
that they had actually entered into relations with DOST MAHOMMED, which rendered the decisive measure of LORD AUCKLAND one of imperative necessity.”186 The journalist is making
several suggestive arguments in this statement. First, they are claiming the factuality of their argument since it is informed by the Indian Papers. The colonial documents are presented as unbi185
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ased and accurate. Second, the author claims that the hostile intentions of Russia had been proven by their actions. Their desire to challenge Britain in India was no longer speculative, but was
a matter of certainty. Third, the Russians were no longer limited to influencing Persia. Their
expanding power was impinging on India’s main buffer state. Finally, and most importantly, the
report asserts that Auckland’s actions were a necessity. This article does not question whether
other strategies could have been more beneficial. Even before the invasion was a military success, the Morning Chronicle was praising it as the only effective solution. This paper was not
alone in complimenting the Indian government on its correct policy and decisive action.
Afghanistan was seen as a critical bulwark for the defence of India. In addition, it was
feared that without immediate action, it would fall to Russian intrigue in the same way that Persia had. The deployment of the Army of the Indus was presented as the ideal means of maintaining an Afghan buffer. On April 14, 1839, the Examiner informed its readers that
France, for example, no longer looks with hateful or intriguing eyes towards British India
– and Affghanistan, formidable once, is divided and weak. Still, however, in resistance to
aggression from the West, lies now, as then, the most necessary policy of our Indian government; seeing that, in place of our old foes, the emissaries of Russia have been busy.
We have lost Persia by their arts, and it is only by the sort of decision manifested by Lord
Auckland in recent occurrences, that we can hope to recover strength in Affghanistan.
The last-named state is the barrier left us, and a victory over the Chiefs of Candahar and
Caubul – the purpose of the recent movement in aid of the restoration of their legitimate
prince – would at once revive its resources, and enlist them on our side.187
This paper places the defence of India in a larger historical context. British India had always
been threatened by other powers. Although France no longer rivaled Britain, Russia had replaced it as a challenger for control of the subcontinent. Afghanistan is also no longer what it
once was. The fractured nature of the polity is seen as a sign of weakness. Its present disunity
prevents Afghanistan from serving as a blocking force against Russian advances. Nevertheless,
187
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its potential as a buffer state remains significant given the loss of Persia to Russian influence.
This paper argues that Auckland’s actions were the only hope of unifying Afghanistan and keeping it under British control. If the invasion was successful, then it was believed that Auckland
had taken a critical step to ensuring the safety and stability of British India.
The specific strategic environment and the various events in Central Asia made prompt
action seem necessary. The various rulers in Afghanistan had been playing Russia and Britain
off against one another in order to achieve local aspirations. It was determined that Afghanistan
had been in limbo for long enough. It was necessary for it to fall within either the Russian or the
British camp. According to the Monthly Review, “the only effectual mode of meeting the impeding danger, which, in fact, is only to be dreaded from Russia acting through Persia and
Affghanistan, is by re-establishing Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk as sovereign of the Affghans. It is
clearly pointed out, we think, that the time as arrived when Affghanistan must either be subjected
to the influence of Russia, or of Great Britain.”188 In order to maintain control of British India, it
was vital that Afghanistan, if not Persia, remain outside of Russian control. The only suitable
way to prevent that state of affairs was by placing Shah Shuja on the throne in Kabul. This action
would ensure British, rather than Russian, influence over Afghanistan. It was suggested that
now is the time for action. With Herat under siege and Russian emissaries in Kabul, the country
was at serious risk of falling to Russia. The Indian government had to take action to turn back
the Russians and shore up the British in the Afghan sector of India’s borderland. The Quarterly
Review echoed this sense of urgency. It affirmed that “it was surely high time to put an end to an
intercourse which was secretly carried on with such intentions, and if the attempt to do so by negotiation should fail, there could be no doubt that the time was come when it was indispensable
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to the security and tranquility of India to take whatever measures might be necessary to separate
Affghanistan from the league which it was proposed to form against us.”189 Due to the series of
events in the region, action was exigently necessary. Action, however, was now synonymous
with military force. With the failure of the Burnes mission, diplomatic options were seen as exhausted. After negotiations had failed, the Quarterly Review contends that resolute military
force was now justified and necessary to ensure the survival of British India.
The usefulness of an unflinching response to the most ominous situation was meant to
unify the various groups and voices in London. Regardless of political affiliation, it was suggested that all of England should rise and recognize the courageous response of Lord Auckland.
The Edinburgh Review proclaimed that “whatever difference of opinion may exist in regard to
the wisdom of the Governor-General’s views, all parties must unite in applauding the promptitude and vigour with which they were carried into execution.”190 The journalist is proclaiming
the benefits associated with decisive action. Through this statement, the metropolitan audience
is being told that the only way to ensure the maintenance of imperial possessions is through unyielding action. Auckland had to make a decision based on his assessment of the ominous situation before him. The journal is justifying the means, while recognizing that the ends may not yet
be settled policy in the eyes of the opposition in Parliament. As long as the British maintained
imperial possessions, they had to be willing to take immediate action to maintain their control.
After praising the decision to act, the press began praising the early results of the invasion.
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4.6 The Spoils of War
The rapid success of the invasion was seen to advance British interests in India and Central Asia. The press consistently highlighted these spoils of war, showing the unquestionable
benefit of military action in accomplishing British objectives. The war was praised as a way to
reassert the prestige of the British army in both Asia and Europe. In its report, the West Kent
Guardian informed its readership that “on Wednesday intelligence reached town of the signal
victory gained by the army of the Indus under Sir John Keane, and of the triumphant success of
its operations in Afghanistan. In these ‘piping times of peace’ the report of such glorious
achievements is as startling as it is gratifying; it renews the fame of our arms in India, and forcible recalls to every state in Europe the recollections of the brilliant and enduring triumphs of
British arms under Sir Arthur Wellesley, which so largely contributed to consolidate our power
in the east.”191 This paper called its readers attention to several aspects of the military success.
First, it highlighted the use of military force during a period that had been defined by diplomatic
negotiations. British arms had been successfully employed to advance policy objectives. It
seems to suggest that diplomacy is not the most effective form of statecraft. Next, it praised the
Indian government for reasserting the power of the British military. By invading Afghanistan,
the Indian government was able to showcase its capabilities to both Asian and European rivals.
Third, this article made it clear that events in Asia can affect the balance of power in Europe.
European competitors would certainly be made aware of this signal victory and forced to think
twice before challenging Britain. Finally, it seems to suggest that violence was necessary for the
establishment of British primacy in India. Together, these arguments further entrench the belief
that the empire in Asia could only be maintained by force of arms.
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The fall of Ghazni was presented as critical to establishing the dominance of British
arms. The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australasia recounted to its audience the events of the invasion and their overwhelming success.
Excepting the impediments offered by the climate, and the marauders, who vex every
camp, the march of the troops from Scinde to Candahar was unopposed. A bloodless
campaign would have been not only an inglorious one, but inefficient for the purpose of
overawing the enemies of the king of Cabul, and of striking a salutary terror into the restless spirits in other quarters that were mediating mischief against our Indian territories;
and, accordingly, a fortress, one of the strongest in Asia, defended by a brave and numerous garrison, fell into the hands of our gallant army in a manner which may well impress
the people of the East with a notion of the invincibility of our arms.192
This article corroborates the belief that the invasion of Afghanistan was not meant to strictly establish Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul. The British sought an opportunity to showcase the
strength of their military forces in the East. The fortress of Ghazni served as the ideal location
for establishing military prestige. The importance of military prestige was not only understood
by imperial officials. It was discussed, and its importance recognized, in unofficial sources as
well. The overwhelming victory at Ghazi not only asserted British power in Central Asia. It also
served to incite patriotic pride in the British public. It was not an unknown and unsung colonial
army that defeated the Afghans, but “our gallant army.” The British public was able to feel as
though they were a part of this awe inspiring success. Finally, this engagement demonstrated the
hopelessness of challenging the British on the battlefield. The importance of the pedagogy of
violence was understood at home as well as abroad.
It was believed that military success would teach a lesson to all hostile powers and would
make India cheaper to maintain. The West Kent Guardian celebrated the army and the potential
effects of its success in the region. It stressed that the Army of the Indus’s “career has been as
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brilliant as it was brief, and renews the salutary lessons formerly taught Indian chiefs and governments – that neither fortresses nor armies can resist successfully the force of British skill,
British discipline, and British gallantry.”193 The pedagogy of violence would ensure that local
rulers would not contest British rule. Through the astoundingly quick and decisive victory, the
Indian army had taught a clear lesson. It demonstrated that there was no force in the region that
could humble British power. It was hoped that this success would make future operations cheaper and more manageable. This theory was evident in the Era’s coverage and expectations about
the next proposed ventures. The author reported that “two new expeditions were contemplated
and in preparation – the one against Saudpore, the other against Kurnaul. The success of the British army in Affghanistan, the preparations for attacking the two cities, just mentioned, and the
recent disposition of the Rajah of Sattara, will render more manageable and mild the most
untractable enemies.”194 The successful invasion was expected to have immediate effects on imperial policy. The rulers of Saudpore and Kurnaul were expected to bow to British demands before force had to be applied. They had already witnessed the impossibility of challenging the Indian army. The Afghan invasion was presented as an economical action. It was relatively cheap,
and it was expected to produce significant benefits.
The comparative advantage of invading Afghanistan was presented in multiple papers.
Even though the invasion and subsequent occupation was costly, India’s normal revenue was
sufficient to pay for it. In addition, they would limit the need to invest large sums of money to
maintain control in the future. The Morning Chronicle reported that “the entire success, as respects the affairs of Affghanistan and Persia, of this bold and sagacious line of policy, by which
an insuperable barrier has been raised against any ambitious designs on the part of Russia, is al193
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ready known to the public. This result has been achieved by means of the ordinary revenue of the
state without opening a loan. It is expected that our difference with Nepal and Ava, intimated, as
those courts must be, by our success beyond the Indus, will be settled without necessity for a resource to arms.”195 The Edinburgh Review corroborated this practical cost-benefit analysis. It
argued that should the Indian government have failed to act, that “it would have damaged us in
the estimation of our own people, and our immediate neighbors, to a degree which no mere pecuniary saving could compensate. And the expense of the expedition, and the subsequent occupation of Affghanistan, has hitherto been met from the ordinary revenue, without borrowing.”196
Taken together, these two articles present several crucial arguments to understanding the perceived benefits of the war. First, both articles claim that the cost of war had been met by the
normal revenue of India. The invasion and occupation were not presented as a financial burden
on the metropole. Second, they suggested that the war had significantly shaped the minds of local rulers. They were forced to recognize the strength of British arms. This newly acquired respect, it was hoped, would limit future military expenditures. The Indian government would no
longer need to utilize military force to achieve its desired objectives. The successful invasion of
Afghanistan would force local rulers to submit to British demands before force had to be mobilized. Thus the strategic benefits gained through the war greatly outweighed the financial cost.
The imperial policy enacted by the Indian government had been successfully proven to be beneficial and necessary.
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4.7 Conclusion
Prior to deploying the Army of the Indus, the Indian government had successfully securitized British India in the minds of many parliamentarians and journalists. However, the legitimacy of the invasion was enhanced by the extent that the wider metropolitan public accepted its necessity and its effectuality. The actions of the Indian government were justified in the journalistic
coverage of the war. In reviewing the major journals and newspapers from the period, it becomes
increasingly evident that the invasion was presented to the public as both necessary and beneficial. British India was seen as an important source of imperial wealth and worth defending even
by war. It was also believed that there was a clear and imminent threat to these possessions. Finally, the costs of war were shown to be inconsequential in comparison to the benefits obtained
by timely and resolute action. Through the imagery of both external rivalries and internal turmoil, the Indian government was able to successfully securitize British India and justify the expansion of British primacy beyond the Indus.
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EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
When every one is dead the Great Game is finished. Not before.
Rudyard Kipling, Kim

The First Anglo-Afghan War did not end with Shah Shuja’s return to the throne of Kabul.
As Kipling suggests in his novel Kim, the geopolitical competition in Central Asia did not consist
of limited relatively bloodless matches. It was, rather, a long-running engagement, that inflicted
significant suffering upon all of its players and could only end when “every one is dead.”197 After the immediate success of the invasion, the Indian government set up a residence in Kabul
supported by a moderate-sized Indian army contingent. Although the country seemed to be relatively quiet during the initial stages of the residency, all of this would quickly change. In 1841,
the British began to experience serious resistance to their presence in the country. Eventually,
this resistance would explode into a full-fledged insurgency. After the deaths of Alexander
Burnes and William Macnaghten, the British decided that they had no other alternative but to
retreat from Kabul. On January 1, 1842, the entirety of the British mission to Kabul, both soldiers and camp followers, evacuated their cantonment and set out for the stronghold at Jalalabad.
Only Dr. William Brydon would survive the entire march and make it safely to the fortress.
Some 16,000 others perished. 198 The failure in Kabul crushed British military and diplomatic
prestige throughout the region. The devastation caused by the war did not end there however.
In order to salvage the British position in the region, the new governor-general of India,
Lord Ellenborough launched the “Army of Retribution.” This expeditionary force sought to reassert British power by striking back at the Afghans rather than re-occupying the country. In the
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spring of 1842, the Army of Retribution forced the Khyber Pass and marched on Kabul. After
rescuing the British hostages and punishing the Afghans held responsible for the revolt, the force
exacted one final grand measure to communicate Britain’s message. They burned the bazaar in
Kabul, the largest marketplace in Afghanistan.199 The Army of Retribution accomplished their
objective by employing the most gruesome practices imaginable. This act of collective punishment precipitated something even worse. According to historian William Dalrymple, “the dynamiting of the great bazaar unleashed in Kabul a wave of rapes, pillage, and murder.”200 Once the
Army of Retribution had inflicted its punishment on Afghanistan, the force withdrew and returned to India. What they left behind was a scene of devastation remembered by Britons and
Afghans:
at sunrise on 12 October 1842, the British lowered the Union Jack on the Bala Hisar, and,
in the words of the Reverend I.N. Allen, ‘turned our backs on the scene of former disgrace and present outrage – a melancholy and disgraceful scene.’ Behind them, Neville
Chamberlain could see ‘the whole face of the sky was red with flames’ and the last remaining quarters of Kabul still standing – all that left of the city of gardens which Burnes
had once thought the most beautiful in the region – well on their way to becoming smoldering wreck. ‘Ruin and revenge had uprooted families and dwellings,’ wrote Munshi
Abdul Karim, ‘few distinguished citizens were left; the bazaars had been pulled down;
open spaces were heaped with corpses and filth and stench polluted the air. Once fine
gardens were now the haunt of scavengers and owls: wretched beggars were left scrabbling in the dust.201
The British left Kabul, and Afghanistan, in ruins. Of course, the bazaar could be rebuilt and reopened. However, the destruction went deeper than the damage done to physical infrastructure.
The war had major and long lasting political and economic effects for Afghanistan. According to Hopkins, “rebuffed, in their strategic designs, the British moved from integrating Af-
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ghanistan into their imperial system as a buffer state to isolating and excluding it.”202 He goes on
to explain that “as European empires expanded through the nineteenth century, and the modern
global order which they represented evolved and came to be more firmly established, more and
more areas previously central to older regional systems were marginalized.”203 Having failed to
establish influence in the country, the British actively sought to quarantine Afghanistan. It was
excluded from the commercial networks developed by the British and other empires over the
course of the nineteenth century. Its economic and political power stagnated due to its isolation.
The war had long-enduring results that still shape, at least in part, the current situation in the
country.
The framework of securitization can provide historians with new and important insights
about the First Anglo-Afghan War. It suggests that imperial policy and practices were not innocent. Rather, “defining a menace is a normative political act. In other words, those who define a
threat can be held accountable, as threats are also the products of their entrepreneurship.”204 The
imperial practices that left thousands of people dead and Afghanistan in a state of absolute ruin
were not self-generated, nor were they preordained to take place. They were rather the creation
of imperial actors. Due to their disastrous effects, it is vital to understand how they were produced, justified, and enacted. Securitization offers the ability to study not only the consequences
of these decisions, but how they were constructed and legitimized.
By analyzing the First Anglo-Afghan War through the lens of securitization, it becomes
clear that imperial officials claimed the right to act in the absence of an informed government
and public in the metropole. London’s unfamiliarity with the diplomatic and military stakes of
202

Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan, 168.
Ibid., 170.
204
Balzacq, Securitization Theory, xiii.
203

98

Central Asia allowed the Indian government to construct a specific narrative that was conducive
to justifying their political objectives and military actions. Only by actively engaging in the distant affairs of imperial borderlands could the metropole hope to understand the claims made by
imperial officials and question their validity and implications. David Urquhart, the former secretary of embassy at Constantinople and future member of Parliament, observed the lack of
knowledge in the metropole, and commented upon its devastating ramifications. He asserts that
in the year 1838 England was unable to detect the preposterousness of the proposition of
the similarity of interests of England and of Russia. Therefore, throughout the country, in
that year, we have the means of knowing that no one could detect a very simple falsehood, or that none could resist a very dangerous crime – that no one could reason to an
evident conclusion, or that no one took interest in the gravest interest of the state. There
is, therefore, nothing in this proposition preposterous; but what belongs to each subject of
the British Crown, and whatever in the transaction is criminal, rests now on the shoulders
of each individual member of the state.205
Urquhart was a very complicated protagonist, famous in historical retrospect as a Russophobe.206
His views cannot be taken without question, any more than those of other political actors in Britain or India. Nevertheless, he does call attention to the high stakes of empire. Without being
properly informed about the situation in Central Asia and India, the British populace was unable
to recognize the unforgiving political realities in the region. This failure made Britons and not
just parliamentarians or officials, responsible to some degree for what transpired in Afghanistan.
The success of a securitizing move is dependent upon the empowering audience accepting
it and providing the securitizing actor with the authority to take action. In line with Urquhart and
Balzacq, the general populace has an obligation to remain informed and concerned about foreign
policy. If this was true in 1830s Britain, when aristocratic elite still governed the nation and the
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empire and a male middle-class electorate had only just been enfranchised, it is all the more true
in the democratic and globalizing conditions of today. Only through education, information, and
discussion will ordinary citizens be able to determine when a referent subject warrants a response, or when it is a false bogey. “Fallacy is the magician’s spell, - truth is the talisman that
sets his victim free.”207
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GLOSSARY
Authoritative Discourse: “An authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it we encounter
it with its authority already fused to it its authority was already acknowledged in the past. It is a
prior discourse. It is therefore not a question of choosing it from among other possible discourses
that are its equal. It is given in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact. Its language is a special (as it were, hieratic) language. It can be profaned. It is akin to taboo, i.e., a name that must
not be taken in vain.”208
Discourse: “A set of ideas and practices which, taken together, organize both the way a society
defines truths about itself and the way it deploys social power.”209
Discourse Analysis: “The use of discourse analysis by the sociological securitization conforms,
if tacitly to the tradition of critical discourse analysis. In many ways, discourse analysis has affinities with Foucault’s insistence on how ‘discourse actively structures the social space within
which actors act, through the constitution of concepts, objects, and subject positions.’ Researchers who dwell on this perspective focus on dialogical structures which are nested in power relations. In general, critical approach to discourse will use a diverse body of data. The variety of
data and the focus of analysis point to the insight that securitization can reside in practices other
than words.”210
Dispositif: “It is a network established between a heterogeneous set of elements such as discourses, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, buildings and institutions. Second, an
apparatus (dispositif) always has a clear strategic purpose and is always a part of a power relationship. Lastly, the apparatus appears at the ‘intersection of power relations and relations of
knowledge.’”211
Empowering Audience: “The audience which a) has a direct causal connection with the issue;
and b) has the ability to enable the securitizing actor to adopt measures in order to tackle the
threat.”212
Functional Actors: “Actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security.”213
Referent Object: “Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate
claim to survival”214
Referent Subject: Things that are seen to be existentially threatening to the referent object.215
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Securitization: “An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors,
policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized
by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent
object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the
referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized
policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development”216
Securitizing Actor: “Actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object –
existentially threatened”217
Securitizing Move: “A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential
threat to a referent object”218

216

Ibid.,, 3.
Ibid., 36
218
Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, Security, 25.
217

107

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1798: Napoleon invades Egypt
1802: Combined British and Ottoman forces defeat France in Egypt
1809: British sign defensive treaty with Ranjit Singh
1812: France invades Russia
1813: Treaty of Gulistan (Russia gains 250 miles of Persian territory)
March 30, 1814: Russian forces enter Paris
1814: Congress of Vienna
1818-1826: Afghan civil war between the Saddozai and Barakzai
1825-1828: Russo-Persian War
1826: Dost Mohammad Khan takes control of Kabul
1828-1829: Russo-Ottoman War
1831: Mohammed Ali leads Egyptian Revolt against Ottoman control
February 20, 1833: Russian fleet arrives in Constantinople in support of Ottoman Sultan
1834: Shah Shuja attempt to reclaim the throne defeated by Dost Mohammad Khan at Kandahar
October 1835: Dost Mohammed Khan requests Russian support against Ranjit Singh
September 20, 1837: Captain Burnes sets up commercial mission in Kabul
November 23, 1837: Persia attacks Heart with Russian backing
December 24, 1837: Captain Vitkevich arrives in Kabul
January 20, 1838: Lord Auckland refuses to support Dost Mohammad Khan’s claim to Peshawar
April 21, 1838: Dost Mohammed Khan receives Vitkevich at Bala Hisar
April 27, 1838: Burnes has final meeting with Dost Mohammed Khan
May 22, 1838: Auckland alerts EIC Secret Committee of his intentions to invade Afghanistan
June 19, 1838: British troops land at Kharg Island
June 1838: Tripartite Treaty signed between British, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja
September 1838: Persia lifts siege on Herat
October 1, 1838: Auckland issues “Simla Manifesto”
October 6-7, 1838: British Cabinet unanimously approves Afghan war
November 1838: The Army of the Indus sets off from the Punjab
February 5, 1839: First official announcement of the invasion in Parliament
March 1839: Army of the Indus passes through the Bolan Pass
March 27, 1839: Indian Papers on Afghanistan ordered
April 25, 1839: Army of the Indus enters Kandahar
July 22, 1839: Battle of Ghazni
August 7, 1839: Shah Shuja enters Kabul
January 6, 1842: British retreat from Kabul
April 5, 1842: Army of Retribution assembled and marches on the Khyber Pass
October 12, 1842: Army of Retribution withdraws from Kabul

